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THREE SCORE YEARS AND TEN

THE S.P.R., 1882-1952

SEVENTY years would be a fairly long period for the life of any research society that was dependent entirely on the financial support and energy of its members and had no backing from professional or academic interests. For such a society to be engaged for all that time on an investigation as full of difficulties and pitfalls as psychical research, to have survived two wars and three decades of almost uninterrupted financial crisis, and at the end to have emerged with a roll of full members much larger than at any time before the Second World War, is a truly remarkable feat. It proves that in 1882 its foundations were well and truly laid, and suggests that this is an appropriate moment to recall to memory the men and women who laid them, the objects they had in view, and the principles by which they wished themselves and their successors to be guided.

'Psychical research' was a new term intended by our founders to mean systematic inquiry into several debatable questions having little in common except that they did not seem capable of a solution within the generally accepted scheme of natural science. There were, for example, stories of apparitions and haunted houses, too numerous and apparently too well authenticated to be lightly dismissed as old wives' tales : how much fact underlay the accumulations of hearsay and credulity? What light would a scientific investigation of hypnotism throw on the structure of the mind, and on those extensions of perceptive faculty reported by earlier inquirers? Could recent experiments in thought-transference be confirmed, and, if so, could the *modus operandi* be defined? Was it true that spirits could 'materialize' themselves in visible and tangible form? Were there forces, unrecognized by Science, capable of moving material objects?

The solution of these and many similar questions clearly depended on the conduct of a more sustained and better co-ordinated inquiry than any that had hitherto been, or could be, pursued by individuals or small groups of friends. A conference of interested persons was accordingly convened in London in January 1882 by Professor William Barrett, the Dublin physicist at which a project was submitted for a society to conduct systematic investigations. This resulted in the formation a month later of the present Society.

Henry Sidgwick, who in the following year became Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge, was elected as first President, and it was fortunate that the nascent Society should have been guided by a man of his character and intellectual gifts, his rare union of cautious judgment with tireless determination, and his experience of many forms of supposedly psychic phenomena gained in active association with Frederic Myers and Edmund Gurney. Both were men of exceptional ability. They had made many experiments and observations, the results of which their wide reading and personal contacts with American and Continental psychologists enabled them to correlate with the significant developments of the time, especially in medical psychology. Of the two, Gurney had the greater aptitude for experiment, and could give more time to it; Myers had no rival as an exponent of facts and ideas, which are now through the Society's work familiar to all, but were then startlingly novel.

The new Society attracted men and women of eminence in many branches of science, in philosophy, scholarship, literature, and politics: to name a few, William Crookes, Lord Rayleigh, Oliver Lodge, A. R. Wallace, William Bateson, W. E. Gladstone, A. J. Balfour, John Ruskin, Alfred Tennyson, R. L. Stevenson, 'Lewis Carroll', Leslie Stephen.

Opinions of the most diverse kind flourished among the members on such questions as the reality of various kinds and instances of supposedly psychic occurrences, and especially as to their bearing on the problem of human survival. Some were already convinced Spiritualists, others hard-shell sceptics. All, however, agreed to accept the principle laid down in the manifesto printed in Volume I of the Society's *Proceedings*, to approach the problems of psychical research 'without prejudice or prepossession of any kind, and in the same spirit of exact and unempassioned enquiry which has enabled science to solve so many problems, once not less obscure nor less hotly debated'.¹ This has been ever since, and still is, the foundation of the Society's policy.

Attempts have indeed been made to turn the Society into a

¹ *Proc.*, i, 4.

doctrinaire body, but these have always been frustrated by the resistance of an overwhelming majority of the members. Secessions there have been from both wings. A few years after the Society's foundation a handful of Spiritualists resigned in disapproval of the critical attitude of some prominent members towards physical phenomena. A dozen years later a few sceptics left because they thought they detected a Spiritualist bias in the Council. But there have been no splits or secessions of importance. Anyone with a fairly long practical experience of S.P.R. work would probably agree that differences of opinion are no obstacle to harmonious co-operation among researchers of ordinary intelligence who make objectivity their aim.

The inaugural manifesto, while attempting no precise definition of psychical research, gave a list of subjects which it was proposed to investigate. This is of historical interest owing to the curious phrasing of some of the items and the way in which they were grouped. The list was comprehensive and may be briefly described as a programme for the investigation of all those aspects of human personality, and the faculties, states, and phenomena connected therewith, that were not recognized by general scientific opinion and were not at the time being fully investigated by any other science. That puts the matter negatively. A positive definition might be harder to formulate, but the full exploration of the subconscious mind (not to be confused with the Freudian 'unconscious') might not be far off the mark.

In practice the new Society was in its earlier years mainly engaged in pursuing those lines of inquiry which several of the members had been following before its foundation, introducing order and method where necessary. Some of the lines of inquiry led nowhere. Others were successfully followed up to a point at which it became profitable to leave further progress to some other organization. Thus, much of the pioneer work in this country relating to hypnotism and medical psychology in general was done by members of the Society, at first separately, but later grouped into a Medical Section. When, however, after the First World War the British Psychological Society formed a Medical Section of its own, there was no point in continuing the Medical Section of the S.P.R.

But there is no other organization to which as yet the main departments of psychical research could be transferred with the assurance that they would receive the thorough investigation that they need. Two main departments have long been recognized. One is concerned with the so-called 'physical' phenomena, such as the movement of objects without muscular or mechanical force ('telekinesis'). The other relates to 'mental' phenomena: for

example, the transmission of impressions otherwise than through the normal channels of sense ('telepathy'). (Needless to say, neither of the above descriptions should be regarded as an assertion that the subject-matter of the description has been proved to exist). As a rough-and-ready classification, which is easily understood, the division into 'physical' and 'mental' may be conveniently retained, even though it suggests a sharp distinction which is no longer fashionable.

As regards physical phenomena, although much good investigation had already been done by Henry Sidgwick and his wife, Myers and Gurney, the general level of investigation was low. It was urgently necessary to raise it by showing inexpert sitters how easily they could be deceived through their inability to observe accurately what happened in the seance-room under the conditions usually prevalent. This was effectively done by Richard Hodgson who arranged for a friend, Davey, to duplicate by 'normal' means, i.e. conjuring, some physical phenomena that were then astounding the public before groups of sitters who were asked to write down what they thought they had seen. They were then told what in fact they had seen and how and why they were in error.¹ When, however, conditions were formulated that would effectively exclude deception, great difficulty was experienced in finding mediums willing to accept them. In consequence the field of investigation into physical phenomena has proved disappointingly barren, and there are few records of positive results obtained by competent researchers under good conditions. The best example is perhaps the report by the Hon. Everard Feilding, W. W. Baggally, and Hereward Carrington, a very strong team, of their sittings in Naples with Eusapia Palladino.²

Research into the 'mental' phenomena was actively pursued along two lines. There were first the collection and analysis of spontaneous occurrences of the kind that are the basis of the traditional ghost story. Two large-scale inquiries were initiated by the Society, the first conducted by Gurney, Myers, and Frank Podmore, and resulting in the publication in 1886 of *Phantasms of the Living*. The second was the 'Census of Hallucinations', the report on which was published in 1894.³ It was mainly the work of Mrs Henry Sidgwick and Miss Alice Johnson, later Research Officer of the Society, both of whom were familiar with scientific method. From *Phantasms* and the Census it was apparent that narratives of persons being 'seen' by their friends, at a time when they were involved in some sudden and unexpected crisis occurring at a distance, a fatal accident, for example, were too

¹ *Proc.*, iv, 381-495, and viii, 259-310.

² *Proc.*, xxiii, 306-569.

³ *Proc.*, x, 25-422.

well authenticated and too numerous to be explicable by mistakes of memory or by chance. A strong case was made out for these so-called 'crisis-apparitions' being due to the 'externalization' by the percipient as a vision of telepathic impressions received by him subconsciously.

It is difficult, many would say impossible, to *prove* through the analysis, however skilful, of spontaneous incidents that mental impressions can be transmitted from one person to another otherwise than by the recognized channels of sensory perception. The elimination of chance as a conceivable explanation cannot be made absolutely certain. These cases can, however, throw much light on the working of telepathy, if confirmed by the results of experiment.

This was the second line of investigation. It was pursued, not perhaps as systematically as it might have been, in the early days of the Society, and is now the main preoccupation of psychical researchers both in this country and in the United States. Several different types of experiment have been tried. Sometimes the subject-matter has been of a more or less complex kind, such as incidents of real life, scenes from fiction, or pictures. In other instances the 'targets' have been cards with a limited number of designs on them to choose from. The former type, of which Dr Gilbert Murray's experiments¹ are a well-known example, is, like the crisis-apparitions and for similar reasons, not conclusive to all minds, although highly informative as to process. It is on the second type that interest is now mainly concentrated, since controlled quantitative experiment not only enables the investigator to determine precisely the extent to which a particular result may be expected to occur by chance, but by the refinements of modern statistical technique to distinguish between different modes of 'paranormal cognition', or 'extrasensory perception' (ESP), as it is now more generally called.

Experiments carried out in recent years by a large number of investigators, among whom Professor J. B. Rhine of Duke University, the late Whately Carington,² and Dr Soal deserve special mention, show that telepathy is not the only paranormal 'mental' phenomenon requiring study. There is evidence that some subjects have a grasp of future events exceeding the powers of rational inference ('precognition'),³ and cases are on record of the direct apprehension of facts about physical objects (e.g. the order of cards in a shuffled pack) not normally known either to the percipient or anyone else ('clairvoyance').⁴ There may be other paranormal faculties to be explored in the same way.

¹ *Proc.*, xxix, 46-110 and xxxiv, 212-74

² *Proc.*, xlvii and xlviii.

³ *Proc.*, xlvii, 21-150.

⁴ *Proc.*, xlviii, 1-28.

The question whether human personality survives the death of the body is one that falls within the scope of the Society's objects, although it is not specifically mentioned in the founders' manifesto. No reasonable person can be indifferent to this problem, and to many psychical researchers, including Myers, it has seemed the fundamental problem, to which all others are subsidiary. But Myers, as his great work *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death* shows, was well aware that the problem must be approached through careful inquiry into the personality of man as we are familiar with it in the flesh, its powers and possibilities. No one, whatever the importance he attaches to the survival issue, ought to regard as mis-spent the time, labour, and skill now being devoted to a thorough exploration of ESP.

The direction taken by psychical inquiry at any given time has always been determined by the human material available for study. The psychical researcher should be prepared to deal with whatever kind of phenomenon he can bring within his net, whether mental or physical, experimental or spontaneous. He cannot plan the order in which problems will present themselves for solution.

A few years after its foundation the Society had the good fortune to contact Mrs Leonora Piper, the most remarkable of all 'mental' mediums. She was under close observation for about a quarter of a century, and when her powers were beginning to decline, another 'mental' medium, Mrs Osborne Leonard, whose powers were little inferior, became available for study. Through these two mediums, both of whom were most co-operative and of unimpeachable integrity, 'communications' were received which impressed as paranormal all the trained investigators with extensive experience of them, and were regarded by many as proof of the survival of the individuals from whom they ostensibly came. The difference of opinion rested on doubts as to the scope of telepathy between medium and sitter, and possibly between the medium and some third party unknown to her.¹

In 1901, a few weeks after Myers's death, began the scripts of 'the S.P.R. group of automatists', which lasted for over thirty years. About a dozen automatists, many of them members of the S.P.R., produced scripts which taken separately often seemed to have little meaning, but when put together were found to convey a coherent message, ostensibly coming from a group which included Myers, Sidgwick, and Gurney. The significant point about these 'cross-correspondences', as they were called, was that they embodied an elaborate pattern divided among the scripts of the different automatists, certainly not attributable to the conscious mind, nor apparently to the subconscious mind of any one of

¹ W. H. Salter, *Trance Mediumship*. (S.P.R., 1950).

them.¹ Something more than telepathy between the living seemed, therefore, to be involved. For this reason, and on account of other features deserving study in detail, the scripts are generally regarded as among the most important pieces of evidence for survival. But once again the question arises, Do we know enough about the paranormal powers of incarnate minds to say with confidence that such or such occurrences can or cannot be assigned to them?

The Society was formed to undertake investigation on a wide front, neglecting nothing that could promote knowledge of human personality. It has until now held fast to this purpose, and should continue to do so. No line of research in which progress has been made should be abandoned. But there is one form of research which did not in the past attract as much attention as it might have done: controlled experiment into ESP. This is a line which now needs, and is likely for some time to need, vigorous prosecution. The planning and conduct of experiments of this kind and the analysis of the results are an extremely technical business calling for highly trained researchers supported by assistants handling the heavy incidental routine work, as is customary in an ordinary psychological laboratory. This task would not in any way prevent the Society from continuing its traditional, qualitative researches, as and when opportunity offered, but would rather advance them by enabling some elements of the problems to which they are directed to be more precisely defined.

W. H. S.

THE SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS IN DREAMS

BY G. F. DALTON

Summary

Brief accounts are given of a number of dreams in which problems are solved, or (as a special case) lost articles found. A general description of such dreams is given. All of them are wish-fulfilment or anxiety dreams, and the dream-figures which appear in some do so as a part of the wish or the anxiety. The wish-fulfilment principle is further used to account for the fact that the lost-article dream usually shows the article as at the time

¹ H. F. Saltmarsh, *Evidence of Personal Survival from Cross-correspondences*. (Bell, 1938).

of finding, not of losing. In some cases there is a precognitive element, although the essential information is obtained through retrocognition; to explain these the hypothesis of a double dream is put forward. In some cases where the dreamer is not the loser of the article (Squires, Chaffin) there must be a telepathic communication; the difficulty of locating this at any moment of ordinary time is considered, and it is concluded that communication takes place between four-dimensional entities. It is shown that clairvoyance is not a necessary hypothesis, retrocognition, telepathy, and precognition being sufficient to explain all the facts. In cases not concerned with lost articles (Lamberton, Hilprecht) the *prima facie* conclusion is that much intellectual work must have taken place in sleep. The incongruity of this with the general habits of the dreaming mind is pointed out, and it is suggested that here too there may be a precognitive element. In conclusion, the 'solution' dream is compared with other psychological events, including religious conversion.

FROM the earliest times a type of dream has been known in which a problem is solved, or (a special case of very frequent occurrence) a lost article found. Professor Dodds¹ gives examples from Greek temple records. Synesius, in his treatise on dreams (A.D. 404 or 405), considers the question in the light of his own experience. '... Of many of the things which present difficulties to us when awake, some of these it [the dream] makes completely clear while we are asleep, and others it helps us to explain. ... It has frequently helped me to write books, for it has prepared the mind and made the diction appropriate to the thought. ... Moreover when I am engaged in the chase, it has suggested to me stratagems of the hunter's art. ...'²

Although he gives no details, it is probable that these revelations did not take a dramatic form; the Muses did not give him advice about his style, nor Artemis about hunting, or he would surely have mentioned the fact.

The first reasonably detailed and trustworthy account comes from St Augustine. As with most of the following cases, I give a condensation.

1. *Eulogius*.³ A rhetorician named Eulogius, an ex-pupil of Augustine's, found himself in difficulties with a passage of Cicero which he had to expound to his class the next day. He was greatly troubled over this, and could scarcely sleep. In the night he dreamed that

¹ 'Telepathy and Clairvoyance in Classical Antiquity.' *Journal of Parapsychology*, December 1946.

² *Treatise on Dreams*, sect. 9; trans. A. Fitzgerald, 1930.

³ *De cura pro mortuis gerenda*, sect. 11.

Augustine appeared to him and explained the passage. Augustine heard this story from Eulogius on his return to Africa.

Augustine quotes this for comparison with the celebrated Milan case, to show that dream-figures may be subjective. The latter, though third-hand and anonymous, can scarcely be left out of consideration.

2. *Milan*.¹ A young man in Milan was proceeded against for a debt incurred by his father, who had recently died. The creditor produced the father's promise to pay. The son was sure that the debt had been paid, otherwise the father would have made some mention of it in his will; however, he had no evidence, and was much distressed. In a dream the father appeared to him and told him where the receipt was. The son found it, and was able to prove that the debt had been paid.

A third dream, of a decidedly different type, is given in Augustine's *Confessions*.²

3. *St Monica*. '... For whence else was that dream of hers, by which thou comfortedst her; after which she allowed me to live with her, and to eat at the same table in house with her, which she had already begun to be unwilling to do, refusing and detesting the blasphemies of my error. [Augustine was at this time a Manichaean.] For she saw, in her sleep, herself standing upon a wooden rule [*in quadam regula lignea*], and a very beautiful young man coming towards her, with a cheerful countenance and smiling upon her, herself being grieved and far gone with sorrowfulness. Which young man when he had demanded of her the causes of her sadness and daily weepings... and she had answered that it was my perdition that she bewailed; he bade her rest contented, and behold, that where she herself was, there was I also. Who when she looked aside, she saw me standing by her upon the same rule.'

Nine years later, Augustine was converted to Christianity.

This is practically a first-hand case, for St Monica told the dream at once to Augustine. Its genuineness is, I think, proved by the play on the word 'rule', which is as intelligible in Latin as in English. Neither Monica nor Augustine would in their waking lives have put a pun into the mouth of a divine messenger; on the other hand, the tendency of the dreaming mind to puns is well known.

I have not come across any well-attested cases occurring during the next thirteen hundred years. It is possible that they were not considered remarkable enough to be worth writing down. Mme de Marteville's experience has survived through the accident of a Swedenborgian legend having formed round it.

¹ *De cura pro mortuis*, sect. 11.

² Book III, trans. W. Watts.

4. *Mme de Marteville*. This lady, whose husband had recently died, was called upon to pay a debt said to have been contracted by him. Knowing him to be methodical in money matters, she was sure that he had paid the debt, and kept the receipt; the latter, however, could not be found. She was very worried, and applied to Swedenborg, who she thought might be able to get in touch with her husband. 'Eight days after she had made her request to Swedenborg, Mme de Marteville saw her late husband in a dream, and from him learned the place where she would find the desired receipt. She woke up at 2 a.m., satisfied herself at once of the truth of the dream, and went to sleep again. Towards eleven o'clock Swedenborg called, knowing nothing of what had happened. He also, as he said, had seen M. de Marteville last night. He wished to talk with him, but the latter would not enter into the subject, because he had to go to his wife in order to let her make an important discovery.' (According to the legend, of course, the discovery was made by Swedenborg.)

The latter part of the foregoing story is from a letter written in 1775 by a Danish 'General von E.', the second husband of Mme de Marteville. Professor R. Hennig, who quotes it,¹ concludes that the story is now cleared up 'in a quite harmless and natural way', apart from the last sentence, which may be considered as 'a scarcely believable embroidery'. But even taking Mme de Marteville's dream by itself, it is surely unduly disparaging to say, as Hennig does, that it is no more wonderful than dozens of similar stories. He gives a case, from 'the quite uncritical Perty', which concerns a clergyman's widow, a secret drawer, and a red velvet bag. This same case is quoted by du Prel and Büchner, the original source, it seems, being J. C. Hennings's *Träume und Nachtwandler*, published in 1784. If there are 'dozens' to choose from, why is this anonymous and doubtful tale bandied about from author to author?

I pass over the affair of Mr R—d, narrated by Scott in a note to *The Antiquary*. It is third-hand and anonymous, it has obviously been 'written up', and it has been given already by half-a-dozen authors. Its chief point of interest is that at the time of the search Mr R—d had given up the search for the missing document. This, as will be seen, is a very frequent feature of these cases; it occurs also in the following:

5. *Lady Miller*.² Sir John Miller died. His wife had always understood that he was to leave her the house and a large jointure; but no will could be found. The heir-at-law allowed Lady Miller to stay for six months in the house in order to search for the missing will. At last

¹ 'Das Urteil über Swedenborg im Lichte der heutigen Wissenschaft.' *Zeitschrift für kritischen Okkultismus*, 1927.

² Miss F. P. Cobbe, 'Unconscious Cerebration', in *Darwinism in Morals and Other Essays*, 1872.

she came to the conclusion that her memory must have deceived her. On the last night of the six months Sir John Miller appeared to her, standing beside the bed, and said solemnly: 'There is a will!' Extra time was allowed for a further search, and in the end the will was found.

There appears to be no reason to doubt the authenticity of this ; but it might be objected that it is a waking hallucination rather than a dream. However, an apparition to a person in bed, who has just awakened or is just about to go to sleep, is so close to the region of dream that it would be pedantic to exclude it.

6. *Cashier*.¹ In an Edinburgh bank a customer one day insisted on being served before his turn. He was a stammerer and noisy, and caused so much annoyance that the cashier agreed to serve him first in order to get rid of him. Eight or nine months later, the books of the bank could not be made to balance ; there was a deficiency of £6. Several days and nights were spent trying to trace the error, but without success. One night in a dream the whole affair of the stammerer was re-enacted, and on waking the cashier (who had completely forgotten the incident) found that the amount paid to the stammerer, £6, had not been entered in the book of interests.

This account is anonymous, but was given to Abercrombie at first hand. Although it contains two unusual features, there is no special reason to doubt its genuineness.

Among over 700 cases set out in *Phantasms of the Living*, only one, No. 66, can be included in the class under discussion. It is another borderland hallucination.

7. *F.R.C.P.*² A doctor was attending a delirious woman. Her symptoms puzzled him ; he suspected alcoholism, but could not confirm this. He wished he could get into the house late at night. One night in bed he had a vision of the proprietor of the patient's house standing under a lamp post in the street, talking to another man. He rose at once, went to the spot he had seen in his vision, and found the two men there. He accompanied the landlord back to the house, went in, and found the maid giving drink to the patient.

This case was twenty years old at the time of recording, and no confirmation could be obtained. It is no doubt genuine, since it satisfied Gurney, Myers, and Podmore ; but one would have liked a great deal more detail.

With Myers's papers in *Proceedings* we are on firm ground. The cases are first-hand and detailed. Eighteen cases are given in Volume viii, and four more in Volume xi. Most of these are straightforward stories of articles lost by the dreamer, and

¹ Abercrombie, *On the Intellectual Powers*, 1831.

² *Phantasms of the Living*, i, 267.

recovered by a direct vision of the article without the help of any dream-figure ; but the following present special points of interest :

8. *Mrs Stuart*.¹ A friend lost a stone from a ring. 'I would not have done this for the world ; it belonged to my father,' he said. All searched, but without success. Mrs Stuart that night dreamed of the stone lying on the lawn under a fallen leaf, with dewdrops sparkling in the sun. She woke, went out at once—it was 6 a.m.—and found the stone just as in the dream.

9. *A.v.S.*² A little girl, eight or nine years old, lost a knife. 'The loss nearly broke her heart.' Next night she dreamed that her dead brother appeared and showed her the place where the knife was. It was found there next day.

10. *Wilmot*.³ Mr Wilmot, a gardener, lost his wages (fifteen shillings) on his way home. He made every enquiry, but without success. During the next night he dreamed that he went to a house he had visited the day before, and, crossing the road after he had left it, walked into a mud heap ; that his foot struck the paper containing the money, the half-sovereign rolled away and the five shillings remained under his foot. The dream was repeated. Next day he went to the place indicated, and the dream fulfilled itself exactly.

11. *Peterson*.⁴ Some crucial evidence was missing in a case in which Mr Peterson was engaged as a barrister. He dreamed that he was addressing the court, and declared that he had found in an account-book an entry which cleared up the mystery. The opposing counsel then denounced him as a liar, Peterson in reply threw an inkstand at his head, and in short the dream proceeded in a dream-like manner. On waking he at once went to his client and found the entry as in the dream.

12. *Yates*.⁵ Mrs Yates lost some photographs. A year later she dreamed of taking out a certain drawer and finding them ; but on waking she did *not* look there.⁶ Some months later the drawer was taken out for another reason, and the photographs were found.

13. *Squires*.⁷ The dreamer's friend, Davis, lost his watch. Both men were at the time employed on an American cattle-farm. Squires was sympathetic ; 'could not keep his mind off the watch, and, after two or three days' thinking of it, went to bed one night still thinking of it.' In his dream he saw the watch. The dream vision is described in detail ; the watch was lying in long grass, with its chain in a half circle. Next day Squires went to the place and found the watch. At the time of losing it he had been some distance away, and could not have seen it fall.

¹ *Proc.*, viii, 384.

² *Ibid*, 387.

³ *Ibid*, 388.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 396.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 383.

⁶ This unenterprising behaviour contrasts with the splendid zeal of Mr Peterson, who started from his bed at 2.30 a.m., called for boots and saddle and relays of horses, knocked up his client after a three hours' ride, had the books brought before him, and *to his surprise* found that the dream was correct!

⁷ *Proc.*, xi, 397.

14. *Howe*.¹ Judge Howe had bought a house, and, naturally, had made enquiries as to title, liens, etc. He dreamed that he met the sheriff, who told him that he was going to sell the house on account of a debt of \$446.50, in a claim of *R. M. v. J. Chaffe*. Judge Howe next day told his dream to Chaffe junior, from whom he had bought the house (the Chaffe mentioned in the dream being dead). Mr Chaffe went to his ledger and turned up an entry of a debt of \$444.50 due to R. M. from his father, which with interest came to \$446.50, the exact amount mentioned in the dream. The debt had however been settled before the death of Mr Chaffe senior.

Mr Chaffe gives his own statement confirming Judge Howe's, and making clear that he knew of the debt, and merely referred to the ledger for confirmation. This was not the case as regards the interest, however. According to Howe, Chaffe was surprised to find in the ledger a pencil entry giving the amount of the interest; Chaffe himself says that he reckoned it there and then.

Professor W. Romaine Newbold's paper on *Subconscious Reasoning*² contains two interesting examples.

15. *Lamberton*. Professor Wm. A. Lamberton tried to solve a mathematical problem by algebraical means. After a week or two, 'I came to the conclusion that I was bogged'. He dismissed the problem from his mind. In his bedroom there was a disused blackboard; and one morning a week later, when waking, he saw on this blackboard a diagram giving a geometrical solution. The diagram vanished at once, but he remembered it, and it proved correct.

Newbold's second case is so well known that it need not be quoted. It is that of Professor Hilprecht, whose archaeological problem was solved by the help of a dream-figure of an Assyrian priest.

Hilprecht's dream, with the R—d, Eulogius, and Milan cases, are quoted by Andrew Lang.³ He adds two others coming within his own knowledge—lost articles recovered without dream-figures. Havelock Ellis⁴ also discusses the question, and gives a modern parallel to the Eulogius case in which the mentor is a chemical expert and the dreamer an inventor. Carpenter⁵ devotes a chapter to 'Unconscious Cerebration', but (apart from extracts from Miss Cobbe's paper) his examples are concerned with somnambulism, and are in a different class. For the same reason I have not included accounts of the numerous lost articles recovered by 'Dreaming Joe' (Johannes Jonsson), as described by Professor A. Bjarnason.⁶ 'Dreaming Joe' was questioned in his sleep, and replied giving information about the objects. Clearly

¹ *Proc.*, xi, 403.

² *Proc.*, xii, 11.

³ *Dreams and Ghosts*, 1897.

⁴ *The World of Dreams*, Constable, 1911.

⁵ *Mental Physiology*, 1874.

⁶ *Journal*, xvii, 53–82.

this is not ordinary sleep, and the cases are not spontaneous and cannot properly be included here.

Mrs Sidgwick's collection *Phantasms of the Living*¹ contains two cases of 'solution' type. One of these (Wilson, p. 71) is a waking impression, but is otherwise similar to the Squires case; the other is a dream. I give Mrs Sidgwick's summary.

16. *Hodgson*.² 'A burglary had occurred at Mrs Hodgson's house on September 30th, 1807, and among other things a small papier-mâché box which she valued had been taken. About a week later she dreamed she went into the coal cellar and found it hidden among the fine coal. She told her daughter of the dream the next morning, but it seemed so absurd that no search was made. In August 1808 Mr Hodgson went into the cellar to see how much coal there was, and found amongst the fine coal the lost box wrapped in a newspaper of the date of the burglary.'

The next case is as well known as Hilprecht's, but it is a crucial one.

17. *Chaffin*.³ J. L. Chaffin in 1005 made a will leaving his farm to the third of four sons. In 1910 he made a new will leaving everything equally between his sons. This will was unwitnessed, but, being holograph, was valid under the local State law. Its existence was not known to anyone else. J. L. Chaffin died in 1921, and the earlier will was proved. In June 1925 the second son, J. P. Chaffin, had vivid dreams of his father, in one of which the latter appeared and said, 'You will find the will in my overcoat pocket.' The overcoat was found. In its lining was not the will but a paper referring to an old Bible. The will was discovered between the pages of the Bible. (In this case also it is uncertain whether the percipient was awake or asleep.)

In a series of articles on 'Remarkable Dreams',⁴ Dr W. H. C. Tenhaeff includes a discussion of the 'solution' type, with numerous examples. These are first-hand and recent, but confirmatory statements and fuller details would be useful in some cases.

18. *W. H.* Mrs W. H. thought she had left her bicycle as usual in a garage, but when she came to claim it, it could not be found. That night she dreamed that she saw the machine standing in a yard of a grocer's shop, and that on coming out on to the street she saw nearby another shop which she had visited on the previous day. The next day she went to the place, looked into the yard, and saw the bicycle. She had left it standing in the street and forgotten about it, and it had been put into the yard overnight. The shopkeeper brought it out for her, so that she never saw the yard from inside as in the dream.

¹ *Proc.*, xxxiii.

² *Proc.*, xxxiii, 351.

³ *Proc.*, xxxvi, 517.

⁴ *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie*, x.

19. *L.P.E.* The solution of an inventor's problem was revealed by the dream-figure of his mother.

20. *J. v. M.* A valuable ring was lost. J. v. M. feared it had been stolen by a maid who had lately been dismissed. In a dream he heard a voice saying: 'What you thought has not happened, and what has happened is what you would never have thought. Be at ease; the ring is not stolen and will come back.' As a result of the dream, he felt easier in his mind, and took no action in the matter. A few days later the ring was found. His daughter had put it in one of the decorations of a Christmas tree, and forgotten about it.

Since the publication of Myers's papers, a number of fresh cases have been printed in the *Journal*. Of these the following are most noteworthy:

21. *Smith*.¹ At a church in Sydney, N.S.W., a hymn tune was sung which Mr Smith had never heard before (although he had seen the name of the tune in an old collection at his house in Aberdeen). He was struck by the tune, and tried to learn it while it was being sung, but forgot it soon afterwards. A month later he left for London. 'On the passage home I often used to try to recall it, as it still haunted me, but I could not do so, try as I might. One night while on the passage home (the passage lasted 116 days from February 3rd, but I cannot even approximately give the date of the night I refer to) I dreamt that I was at the same church in Balmain, that the same hymn was sung to the same tune and that I resolved that this time I should not forget it . . . Just as it finished, I awoke with the tune ringing in my ears and I knew it correctly.' He never afterwards forgot it.

In May of the same year a case is given which concerns two sisters. One of them was puzzled as to whom a certain person resembled; the dream which gave the answer was dreamed by the other sister, who had seen neither the person in question nor the other person whom he resembled. Apart from occurring to the wrong sister, the dream is of normal type.

The next case of interest is:

22. *Blaikie*.² 'In April, 1892, I had given to me an old cross of very good old paste and good design, which I shortly afterwards wore, for the first time, at the theatre. On reaching home in the evening I found that I had dropped it or had it stolen, and went to bed mourning its loss.

'On falling asleep I dreamed what actually had happened—that I had lost it on my way from the theatre—but then fancied that I found myself, in broad daylight, in the drawing-room of the house in — Place, W., where I was then staying, and which overlooked the front door. In my dream I looked out of the window and saw, lying in the gutter immediately in front of the door, my cross, and rushed downstairs and into the street and picked it up.

¹ *Journal*, viii, 29.

² *Journal*, x, 30.

'In the morning I had quite forgotten my dream, but in the afternoon when I was having tea in the drawing-room with my (hostess), she spoke of the cross I had lost and the unlikelihood of my ever seeing it again. I then remembered the dream, and told her about it.

"I went forward to the window", I said, "and looked out, and there it was, lying in the gutter, close to the kerb."

'She laughed, and we both went to the window and looked out, and just then the sun caught on something lying in the gutter, just at the kerb.

'It was the old paste cross.'

Miss Blaikie's account is corroborated by her hostess.

Several cases of bodies being found through dreams are on record. In the following the 'solution' aspect is especially noticeable :

23. *Blunt*.¹ James Blunt, a coal-miner of New Lambton, Co. Durham, and Police-constable Egleton, stationed in the same district, were old friends. One Saturday night in January 1902 Egleton disappeared. A search was organised over the whole district, and carried on energetically for four days by parties which included thirty or forty constables ; but it proved fruitless. Blunt also assisted in the search. 'He talked a lot about him, saying he wished he could be found.' In the course of the search a certain stream running through Brecon Hill Wood had been explored by Blunt and others. On Thursday morning Blunt told five people (who confirm the story) of a dream he had had in the night. 'I dreamt that I saw the burn running through Brecon Hill Wood, and in the stream by a stump of a tree P.C. Egleton was lying with his head to the stump, and I saw him in the dream lying in two feet of water.' He went to the spot at the first opportunity, later in the day, and found the body at the place seen in the dream. There was afterwards noticed a mark on the bank, which may have been made by Egleton falling or throwing himself in. These facts came out at the inquest, at which an open verdict was returned ; but Egleton had been very depressed before his disappearance, and had had a breakdown in health and family troubles as well.

Another 'lost body' case, Mme Clarinval's, can scarcely be included here, as it is a daylight hallucination ; it is discussed later.

24. *Wild*.² Miss Ida Wild lost a hammer. 'I hunted everywhere likely for it, and had it constantly in mind.' Some weeks later, 'I dreamt I was walking in the long rough grass near the beehives, and saw my hammer, fine and bright, on the top of the grass.' The hammer was found there, but entirely covered by grass which had to be cut away to find it. It was not bright, but very rusty, and the haft sodden.

¹ *Journal*, x, 298-303. For some extra information bearing on this case I am indebted to Mr D. B. Cameron of the King's College, Newcastle, Psychical Research Society.

² *Journal*, xxii, 28.

The case of Mrs X. (*Journal*, xxix, p. 272) is of the Squires type ; a key lost by Mr X when out fishing was found by Mrs X through a dream, although she had never been to the spot. Of the same type is a case described by Major Günther,¹ Frau Günther being the loser and her daughter the dreamer. He gives two other cases of lost articles recovered ; but the persons concerned are professional mediums, and the present paper must limit itself strictly to spontaneous cases.

These examples have been chosen from some ninety cases.² Doubtless a more thorough search would disclose many more, but it is clear that dreams of 'solution' type are rarer in the literature than telepathic or precognitive dreams of the ordinary kind, which can be counted by the hundred. (In the present paper, both telepathy and precognition will be taken as established.) However, enough have been recorded to distinguish the type. Some problem is presented to the waking mind which it cannot answer. The subject is very much concerned over his failure.³ This is expressly stated in most cases ; in others, such as Chaffin's (17), it may be presumed. Sometimes he dismisses the question from his mind, and abandons the search ; in others, that he was not worrying acutely at the time of the dream may be presumed from the simple fact that he was asleep. In a dream the solution of the problem is presented, sometimes by a direct vision, sometimes through the mouth of a dream-figure. On waking the solution is tested and found correct.

In contrast, the ordinary precognitive or telepathic dream arrives out of a clear sky. In some examples (such as the Terriss murder, quoted later) the dream may be the fulfilment of a subconscious wish, but not the solution of a problem consciously brooded over. It is this, rather than the action taken as a result of the dream, which marks off the class. It is true that these dreams are almost invariably, and other veridical dreams rather rarely, followed by action⁴ ; but this is simply because unless action was taken the

¹ *Zeitschrift für metapsychische Forschung*, December 1936.

² They include most of the cases with dream-figures, and every well-evidenced case which appears to be an exception to the generalisations which follow. The cases not mentioned are mainly simple lost-article dreams, or are insufficiently detailed or authenticated.

³ One of Dr Tenhaeff's correspondents, who frequently solves problems in sleep, says that the more he concentrates on the problem when awake the more easily does he dream about it.

⁴ The exceptions are St Monica (3) and J. v. M. (20), where inaction was enjoined by the dream itself ; Yates (12), Hodgson (16), and possibly Blaikie (22), where the article was found by chance ; and Smith (21), where no action was necessary.

lost article would not be found, or the problem would not be solved, and the dream would never be revealed as veridical at all.

There is an interesting group of cases which, though they cannot be included with the 'solution' type, should not be left unmentioned; they may be described as 'professional anxiety' dreams. This group includes 'Father Brompton' and the dying woman¹; the coachman and the mare²; the surveyor and the bridge³; the insurance official and the fire⁴; and the biographer and her subject.⁵ The information is in most cases acquired through precognition, but the first case is possibly telepathic, and the last probably retrocognitive. An interesting feature is the large proportion of auditory dreams or hallucinations.⁶

Almost all these dreams, it is clear, are wish-fulfilments. The one exception—Howe's (14)—is an anxiety dream, which is a wish-fulfilment reversed. They differ from the majority of the class in that the dream is not a substitute for the real-life event, but a stepping-stone to it; but this does not affect the structure of the dream itself. When the figure of some other person supplies the information which solves the problem, it is to be presumed that his appearance is a part of the wish: 'I wish F. were here to tell me about this.' F. must therefore be a person to whom the subject would naturally turn. He must be believed to be able and willing to supply the information, and he must be known to the dreamer. This does not exclude Hilprecht's priest, whose appearance would be quite familiar to the Professor, or St Monica's 'beautiful young man', the traditional divine messenger; but it explains why the

¹ *Proc.*, xxxiii, 287.

² *Ibid.*, 138.

³ *Proc.*, viii, 397.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 396.

⁵ *Journal*, v, 253.

⁶ The following story has no evidential value, having been handed down through three generations, but on internal evidence appears genuine. I take it from Dr C. Dickson's *Life of Michael Dwyer* (p. 180). It dates from about 1800, when Dwyer was being hunted through the Wicklow mountains, with a price on his head. A year or two before, McAlister, one of his followers, had saved his life at the cost of his own. 'One night as Dwyer had retired to a cave he had made in a double ditch in Leitrim (Glen Imaal) and which was unknown to anyone except McAlister and himself, McAlister's spirit appeared, called him and saved his life, he said. Before he was long in, he lay down tired after his watchful day and soon was in slumber, when to his great astonishment he was awakened by a voice calling him. He sat up, listened for some time and heard nothing; but thinking he was only dreaming, lay down again in silence to listen, whereupon he distinctly heard McAlister's voice calling him in stern tones to "get up". He at once recognised the voice, leaped up and peeped out just in time to find that he was almost surrounded by redcoats . . .' and succeeded in escaping. It should be added that McAlister was the only Ulsterman in Dwyer's party, and his Northern accent would be quite unmistakable. As a dream-figure he is obviously highly appropriate.

loser does not appear as F. in cases of the Squires type (13), why Peterson (11) did not imagine the opposing counsel or his client as giving him the clue to the missing evidence, and why Mrs W. H. (18) did not see the grocer in her dream. In Howe's case (14), similarly, the sheriff is part of the anxiety, and so comes in more aptly than Chaffe senior or junior, either of whom, if he had the information, might not be willing to give it. The sheriff, also, would be a familiar figure to the Judge.

The deceased person is obviously the only possible dream-figure in cases of the Marteville type (4), and he never fails to make his appearance. That the pious Monica sees angels, and the free-thinking Synesius sees none, needs no lengthy explanation. Two cases, however, remain a little anomalous—A. v. S. (9) and L. P. E. (19). The little girl's dead brother knew no more of the knife than anyone else, and his entry into the dream seems inappropriate. Similarly, there is no reason to suppose that the inventor's mother knew anything of mechanics or chemistry. But both these are persons to whom the dreamers were accustomed to turn in *any* difficulty; their use in the dream is inartistic, perhaps, but not unnatural.¹

The only case which cannot be brought under the formula 'I wish F. were here to tell me' is F. R. C. P.'s (7). The landlord, however, is not a dream-figure in the sense in which we have been using the term. He is not the bringer of news, but is himself the sought-for object. The message conveyed is: 'The landlord is coming home late; you can meet him and get into the house.' This is conveyed in the simplest possible way.

There are a number of cases in which the dreamer has no reason to suppose that anyone can help him. In nearly all such cases the dream is in the form of a direct vision. Sometimes, however, the information is difficult to express in images. This difficulty is surmounted very neatly in Peterson's case, in which he is himself the dream-figure. In J. v. M.'s an impersonal voice is heard, and the same device is used in another dream of Peterson's² which I have not quoted. This difficulty in direct presentation is,

¹ The 'Devil's Sonata' dream of Tartini might be cited as an example of an inappropriate dream-figure. However, the dream is not of 'solution' type. Tartini was under no obligation to compose a sonata; there was no problem, and no anxiety. I am not therefore compelled to explain the Devil. However, it may be of interest to note that Tartini was destined by his parents for the Church, but expressed such a repugnance to the idea that they were compelled to give it up. From an early age, music and the Church must have been opposed to each other in Tartini's mind; that the Devil, the enemy of the Church, should appear as the provider of music, is quite in accordance with the logic of dreams.

² *Proc.*, viii, 395.

perhaps, a contributory cause of the use of imaginary figures like Hilprecht's priest.

In studying spontaneous cases, the only form of experiment possible is the construction of fictitious cases, illustrating or contravening the rules derived from the real cases. If the passage of time, or a more thorough examination of the literature, supplies real cases corresponding to the first fictitious class, but not to the second, these rules will be established more firmly ; if not, they must be reconsidered. Thus, the conclusions arrived at above may be summed up by saying that the following should *not* occur :

Fictitious Case I. D. is much concerned over a certain problem. In a dream he sees F., a person quite unknown to him, or an acquaintance whom he has no reason to associate with the problem ; this person tells him the solution. D. wakes, tests the solution, and finds it correct.

It appears, then, that the conclusions of Augustine in the Milan case¹ are fully justified. The dream-figures are in all cases constructs of the dreamer, and have no relation to the objective situation. The appearance of Chaffin senior to Chaffin junior (17) does not prove survival ; the non-appearance of Davis to Squires (13) does not disprove telepathy. The sole means of judging is the information itself.

It is indeed remarkable that this information shows so little sign of its origin. It will not be disputed that in most lost-article cases the source of the dream is the revival of a forgotten memory. That memory must be of *the act of losing* ; yet this act itself hardly ever appears in the dream. The following seems a very plausible sequence :

Fictitious Case II. D. loses a valued article. He dreams of putting it in a certain place. On waking he looks there and finds it.

Or, in the Marteville type :

Fictitious Case III. F. dies. D. cannot find his will. He dreams of F. going to a secret drawer, etc., and putting the will there. It is found there on waking.

Nothing exactly like either of these is known to me. There are a few special cases discussed below ; but in general the dream concerns itself with the finding, not the losing. Mrs Yates (12) does not dream of putting the photographs in a drawer, but of taking them out. Squires does not see the watch fall ; he sees it fallen. Mrs Hodgson (16) does not dream of the box being hidden in the cellar, but of the box being discovered ; and so on.

Here again the wish-fulfilment principle must be invoked. The dreamer's thought is not 'I wish I knew how I lost the article',

¹ And of Mr Tyrrell (*Proc.*, xlviii, 81 ff.).

or even, in most cases, 'I wish I knew where it is', but 'I wish I had it now'. The dream, therefore, satisfies the wish most completely by looking forward to the point of application of the information. Peterson, for instance, sees himself making his point in court. It is the same in anxiety dreams; Howe's vision of the sheriff about to sell the house is a long leap forward from the (erroneous) information of Mr Chaffe's debt.

Miss Wild's case is an exception which, in the true sense, proves the rule. She sees the hammer clean and bright, lying on top of the grass, as it was when lost. But clearly it was no part of her wish that the hammer should be rusty and sodden, and only extricated with difficulty from the long grass which had grown over it. Even in this case, it is to be noted, the action of losing the article is not reproduced in the dream.¹

It is reproduced in Smith's case (21); but a hymn tune is no ordinary lost article; the moment of waking from the dream was the moment of finding. Smith was not looking forward to any special future occasion on which he was to sing the hymn, and he had not been taught it by anyone who could serve as a dream-figure. In the circumstances it is difficult to see what else the dream could have done.

The same applies to the cashier's dream (6). This is not a lost-article dream; the missing amount had not been recorded anywhere, and the recollection of the event was the only way in which the problem could be solved. This case is also interesting in suggesting a possible unconscious motive for the forgetting—the wish to be rid of an unpleasant and embarrassing scene. It may be suggested that an unconscious motive is at work in some other lost-article cases; but in the majority the loss seems to have occurred very naturally.

The dream which looks forward to the point of application of the information provides favourable conditions for precognition; and precognitions are in fact found. The cases of Stuart (8), Squires (13), Blaikie (22), Hodgson (16), W. H. (18) and F. R. C. P. (7) are *prima facie* either clairvoyant or precognitive; precognition is possible in those of St Monica (3) and J. v. M. (20); and the precognitive element in the Wilmot case (10) is inescapable.

The chief difficulty about precognition is, of course, the apparent reversal of causation. The first serious attempt to solve

¹ In one of Dreaming Joe's dreams the action of losing was reproduced, but the case was denied by Joe himself and could not be confirmed. In another, Joe dreamed of a thief putting a missing purse in a certain place, *but it was not found there*, nor was the thief ever identified. This suggests that with professional 'clairvoyants' (Joe was almost a professional) the desire to impress the client may have its effect on the form of the vision.

this problem was made by J. W. Dunne.¹ In Dunne's theory there are an infinite number of Time dimensions, of which, however, only the first two need concern us here. His 'Time 1' is 'ordinary' time; an observer to whom this is Time sees a three-dimensional world in which various events occur in succession. But there is also a 'Time 2', and a corresponding 'Observer 2'. To the latter, Observer 1's three-dimensional field of view appears as a moving section of a four-dimensional world. By concentrating his attention on Observer 1's view, Observer 2 perceives the three-dimensional aspect of things. If this attention is relaxed, however, or if Observer 1 is not functioning—that is, in states of abstraction or unconsciousness—Observer 2 reverts to his proper four-dimensional view. He then sees Time 1 as an extra dimension of space, and all its length is equally present (though not equally accessible or equally interesting) to him. He can thus perceive an event which is future to Observer 1; but to him it is neither future nor an event, but a mere static configuration. Observer 1's impression that an event is happening is an illusion caused by the 'present moment' which moves along Time 1—an illusion similar to that of a cinematograph. The only events which Observer 2 sees as really happening are, first, the steady movement of the 'present moment' along Time 1, and, secondly, occasional changes in the Time 1 'future' due to intervention—of which more must be said later.

It follows from the above that the Freudian 'unconscious', or the 'subconscious' or 'subliminal mind' of other authors, which is dominant in dreams or states of abstraction, must contain a large element of Observer 2.




FIG. 1

Professor C. D. Broad² has also produced a theory of pre-cognition using two Time dimensions. These are not, however, connected by any law as in Dunne's theory. For illustrative purposes they are conceived as being at right angles (Fig. 1).

¹ *An Experiment with Time*, 1927.

² *Knowledge and Foreknowledge*. Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. xvi, 1937.

An event X which is after Y in Time 1 may therefore be before it in Time 2.

Broad's theory is much less elaborate than Dunne's ; indeed it is a mere suggestion, put forward in the most tentative manner. It can be seen, however, that its solution of the problem of reversed causation differs radically from Dunne's. Dunne asserts that the supposed future event is really present, Broad that it may be both past and future. It is thus theoretically possible in Broad's theory, but not in Dunne's, for an event to be the cause of its own cause. Broad's two times exist together ; an event which is before another in Time 1 may be subsequent to it in Time 2, and causation may operate in either Time dimension. To any of Dunne's observers, however, there is only one real Time, and all inferior times are dimensions of space. Observer 2 may see an apparent cause-and-effect sequence running along Time 1, but it is merely apparent, frozen as it were ; events, to him, happen in Time 2, and it is only in Time 2 that there can be causes and effects.




FIG. 2

It happens that one case in the present series raises this question sharply. It is Wilmot's. The dream contains a precognition of a future event—it is therefore presumably caused by that event ; but the event itself—the finding of the money—is the result of the dream ! This appears to be an example of circular causation, and hence tells strongly in favour of Broad's theory as against Dunne's.

Dunne's theory, however, contains an important feature which so far has been barely mentioned—the conception of 'intervention'. Observer 2 is not merely a passive spectator. He can intervene to alter the Time 1 future, and there are many cases on record to suggest that he sometimes does so. Fig. 2 represents such an intervention.

XY represents the subject's life, and P the 'present moment'. X_1Y_1 , X_2Y_2 , etc., are states of the life which are successive in Time 2. The 'present moment' moves along XY, occupying the successive positions P_1 , P_2 , P_3 .

At the moment of Time 2 represented by the bottom line, Observer 2 looks along X_1Y_1 and observes the point Y_1 . The result is, let us say, a dream about an aeroplane crash. As a result of the dream he takes action—for instance, he cancels his intended flight. This action results in an alteration of the Time 1 future, including a lengthening of the subject's life as shown by X_3Y_3 . Here we have three events—the dream, the cancellation of the flight, and the lengthening of the life—which are linked in a causal sequence. Now, starting from the latter end, the sequence can be traced back in Time 1 without difficulty up to a certain point. The lengthening of the life is caused by the cancellation of the flight, which is caused by the recollection of the dream. But this last item has no causal ancestor in Time 1. In that dimension it appears to spring from nowhere. To trace the chain further we must employ the outlook of Observer 2; we can then say that the dream resulted from observation of Y_1 . (It may be remarked that Y_1 , the event precognized, is not future to any observer; for Observer 1 will experience quite a different event when he comes to the point in X_3Y_3 corresponding to Y_1 . *No observer in the Dunne series can foresee the real future.* In particular, no observer can foresee the results of his own intervention.)

If Observer 2 intervenes, therefore, the causal sequence must be traced first in Time 2 and then in Time 1. The moment of change from one Time to the other is, presumably, the moment when the dreamer wakes. He gets up, goes about his business, and the next night goes to sleep again. But now the Time 1 length open to his inspection is not X_1Y_1 but X_3Y_3 ; in other words he may now precognize the events which will (in Time 1) result from his recent intervention. This may result in a new intervention, and so on indefinitely; the chain of cause and effect zig-zags across the diagram. But it cannot turn back, either in Time 1 or Time 2.

We may now return to the Wilmot case. Let us suppose that Wilmot has a dream in which his memory of the losing of the money is revived. This, just as much as a precognition, is the work of Observer 2; the dream is derived from inspection of a part of XY between X and P. He wakes up with the memory of the dream. This, given his character and all other circumstances, determines that next day he will search for the money and find it in the place dreamed of. In other words, the recollection of the dream is intervention, and alters the Time 1 future. As he still lies in bed, the finding of the money has become part of that future. There is therefore no reason why, if he goes to sleep again, he should not have a precognitive dream of the finding; and this will be the case however short or partial the waking may be. If now the second dream obliterates the memory of the

first, it will make no difference, for the second dream contains the same essential information as the first, plus some extra details derived from precognition. The one-way sequence of causation is thus preserved.

It remains to be seen how this hypothesis will apply to other cases. It has already been noted that the act of losing the article very seldom appears in the dream, although it must have been the dream's starting-point. This missing link in the causal chain must have existed somewhere, and will fit very neatly into the hypothetical first dream. It may appear surprising that the first dream is so completely forgotten; but after all the remembering of a dream, not its forgetting, is the unusual event, and in nearly all cases the two dreams may be presumed to be so alike that they would become fused in recollection. Secondly, the first dream *does* sometimes leave a trace in memory. In the Wilmot case itself, we are told that the dream was repeated. It is quite possible that on its first occurrence it lacked the details about the money rolling away. In Miss Blaikie's case (22) the whole mechanism can be seen. The dream first refers to the losing, and then passes to the act of finding. That the first part of the dream is preserved on this occasion is, perhaps, due to the circumstance that Miss Blaikie feared her ornament had been stolen. By re-enacting the loss, the dream reassures her on this point. The message of the dream is in fact in substance the same as J. v. M.'s, although so differently expressed.

If this theory of the Wilmot case be accepted, it can be applied also to the touches of apparent clairvoyance in other cases. Mrs Stuart saw the stone lying under a fallen leaf, with dewdrops sparkling in the sun—just as it was at the time of the dream, but also just as it was when she found it a few minutes later. Squires saw the watch among tall grass, 'the steel chain lying in a half-circle'—a picture that could not have been derived from the mind of Davis, the loser; but Squires himself saw it so on the following day. Mrs W. H. leaves her bicycle in the street, and finds it in a yard; she dreams of it in the yard. F. R. C. P. finds the landlord talking to a friend, just as he had seen him in the vision; he did not enquire, apparently, if the friend had been there at the time of the vision some minutes earlier. Howe dreams, not of the amount known to Chaffe, but of the amount plus interest, which he did not find out till later. Blunt sees the body of Eggleton as nobody—including Eggleton himself—had seen it at the time, but as he himself saw it next day.

The precognized details may on this hypothesis be set aside, as the dream-figures may be set aside, in the search for the source of the dream. What remains is the bare minimum of information

necessary to cause action. How does this information find its way into the dream? There are several possibilities.

I. *Chance*. The hypothesis of chance coincidence has been given very little attention in this connexion. It implies that there are many such dreams, and that the non-veridical ones are not recorded. It is true that these would naturally be rather elusive. If Peterson, for instance, after his Paul Revere ride, had *not* found the missing evidence, it is pretty certain that he would not have told the story to Myers or anyone else! But the probability of finding the object by pure chance is so low in such cases as those of Squires and Mrs Stuart that these cases would require to be balanced by thousands of falsidical ones. It is exceedingly improbable that all these cases would have escaped the attention of all the authorities who have considered the subject.

Moreover, since the publication of *Die Traumdeutung* one does not talk so lightly of random dreams. A dream impressive enough to lead to action is almost certainly *not* random, whether veridical or otherwise. If in such a dream a lost object is seen in some place, there must be *some* association between the place and the object. If there is a chance coincidence, it must be between two such associations; for instance a missing person may, in life, have frequented a spot where his body is later discovered. In Blunt's case, however, this does not seem very likely. Or the association may be of the symbolic type; the connexion between money and dirt, noticed by Freud, may have led Wilmot's dreaming mind to the consideration of mud-heaps; but we have still to explain why he dreamed of the one particular mud-heap which actually contained the money, out of all the mud-heaps which he may have seen. And what association other than real contiguity could exist between Davis's watch and a particular clump of grass?

These considerations apply chiefly to dreams of the true 'solution' type, preceded by anxiety over a particular problem, and followed by action. As regards wish-fulfilment and anxiety dreams in general, it is undeniable that the great majority come out of the gate of ivory. The St Monica type, in which the dreamer's action does not cause the *dénouement*, is quite easily explicable on a chance basis. The event prophesied is, in each of our two cases (3, 20), not very improbable. But even here the hypothesis of chance coincidence would be greatly strengthened if there were a large number of cases on record in which divine messengers, or impressive voices heard in dreams, gave *false* information.

II. *Retrocognition*.¹ In most of the cases it is probable, or at

¹ Following Myers, I use this term rather than 'hypermnnesia', to mark its similarity to precognition and its difference from ordinary memory.

least possible, that the information was at one time in the dreamer's possession, in which case its revival in the dream is understandable. It is not necessary that he should have consciously known it, for there is ample evidence that incidents ignored by consciousness may be noted unconsciously.¹ This explanation will not serve, however, for the dreams of St Monica, J. v. M., Squires, Howe, Hodgson, Chaffin, and the vision of F. R. C. P. ; and in the Marteville case it is unlikely.

III. *Precognition*. There is no difficulty in accepting Mrs Hodgson's dream as precognitive, and the same explanation is applicable in any of the cases in which there is no intervention by the dreamer : J. v. M., St Monica, and Yates. The nine years' interval between dream and event in St Monica's case is unusually long, but intervals of twenty years and more are known. In Blunt's dream (23) it must be borne in mind that the body of Egleton would almost certainly have been found sooner or later, even without the help of the dream. Precognition is thus a possibility here ; but so is retrocognition ; and even a *post mortem* telepathy from Egleton is not out of the question. In fact this case runs the whole gamut of hypotheses, and it is best to follow the jury's example and return an open verdict.

IV. *Clairvoyance* is a possible explanation in every lost-object case. The form of the vision in such cases as Miss Wild's is no argument against this, just as the form of Mrs Stuart's vision is no argument in its favour. The objection to clairvoyance is that it explains all cases, both those which occur and those which do not. Consider the following :

Fictitious Case IV. A house is bombed, or a ship is wrecked, and a valued possession is lost. The dreamer sees it among the ruins, or on the seashore, in some place in which it would not have been discovered without the aid of the dream.

The antecedent conditions here must have existed in many cases ; but as far as my acquaintance with the literature goes, the

Of late there has been a tendency to use 'retrocognition' for the Versailles and similar cases, in which the percipient seemingly experiences events of a remote past. These events, however, are not part of the *subject's* past. On the hypothesis that he is re-living the past of someone else, the case is one of retrocognitive telepathy ; otherwise, of retrocognitive clairvoyance.

¹ Secondary personalities of the 'Sally Beauchamp' type might be described as the nearest possible approach to a conscious unconscious. They often claim to be able to 'look out of the corner of the eyes' when the primary personality is looking elsewhere. This has been very interestingly described by 'B' of the BCA case, and verified by Morton Prince in experiments with the same subject. (*Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, iii and xiv.)

dream has never resulted. To establish clairvoyance in such a case, it must be shown (i) that no human eye saw the lost object in the place in which it was found (this excludes retrocognition and telepathy); (ii) that the discovery would not have been made except for the dream (this excludes precognition).¹ Two cases in the *Journal* come close to this; neither is a dream case, and in neither is the evidence conclusive. Mrs 'Watson'² lost her wedding ring, and was directed by automatic writing to look for it in a sack of waste paper. It was found there, and was supposed to have been carried in by rats—the ring was lost in 1944, and the sack was filled with waste paper in 1945. It is unlikely that the ring slipped in along with the paper; however, it is not at all impossible.

The other case is from the *Revue Spirite*, April 1921.³ Mme A. Clarinval's son René, an airman, was killed in 1916, and buried by the Germans. After the armistice Mme Clarinval searched for the grave, but it could not be found. Some months later she had a waking vision of her son, apparently alive, between two unknown men. The one on the left seemed to be a German, and the other a Russian. A further search was made three months later (not in consequence of the vision), and it was established that the body had been buried in the German cemetery as unknown. The officer in charge refused to let the bodies be taken up for examination. 'But I was determined. We returned to Verdun . . . and sought out the officer in command of the graves commission. After a long discussion . . . he yielded, and gave us authority to make a search. Next day at 5 in the morning we were at the cemetery . . . By 12 o'clock 20 coffins had been opened without any result. The men went to dinner, and my husband and I stayed there, greatly depressed; for we were beginning to lose hope . . . Suddenly *I thought of my vision* . . . I said, "Yes, we shall find him; he is between a Russian and a German. There was a Russian in the cemetery at Dieppe; let us look for him." The men came back and resumed their work, whilst we ourselves looked for the Russian . . . At last, at 4 o'clock, I found the Russian. To his left there was an unknown soldier, and to the left of the unknown a German.' The unknown corpse was exhumed, and proved to be that of René.

Camille Flammarion, who published the case, was perplexed by the form of the vision, which does not correspond with the reality.

¹ The possibility of such a case being precognitive is denied by Dunne's theory, since no observer can foresee the result of his own intervention. Their non-occurrence is therefore a point in favour of the theory.

² *Journal*, xxxiii, 230-9.

³ Quoted in *Journal* xx, 244-9.

After a comparison with others, and especially with the Wild case, it can be seen that there is no difficulty here. Mme Clarinval's vision is the result of a very powerful wish. But that wish is not for a grave, nor for a corpse—the mother wants *her son*.

The first criterion of a clairvoyant case is here well satisfied. No human being knew that René Clarinval was buried between a Russian and a German. The second, however, is more doubtful. It seems clear that Mme Clarinval's actions were not affected by the vision during the early part of the search. The question is, if she had not recollected it, would she have given up the search in despair? On the one hand, the cemetery contained more than 2,000 graves. We are not told how many of these were of unknown soldiers—an important point—but there may have been several hundred. Without the vision, the search would have taken some days, and possibly weeks. On the other hand, we must consider the intense determination of Mme Clarinval, which broke down bureaucratic opposition, and sustained her through the gruesome examination of dozens of corpses. On the whole, it seems likely that even without the vision she would have persisted in her search, at least for some time. It is therefore possible that she would have achieved her object without the help of the vision; the latter, consequently, may be precognitive.

I should add that both these cases are ascribed to intervention by spirits. There is no need to discuss this hypothesis, however, because, as Mr Hubert Wales pointed out in the Clarinval case,¹ the dead persons knew no more of the facts than anyone else, and could only have acquired them through clairvoyance. This is contrary to the principle of the economy of hypotheses; if clairvoyance is a fact at all, there is no reason to suppose that a dead person is more clairvoyant than a living person. The sole basis for the spiritist theory is the form in which the information is conveyed; and this form, it has been shown, is moulded to suit the wishes of the percipient.

V. *Telepathy*. If clairvoyance is rejected, Squires's dream must be considered as telepathic; and, if we include post-mortem telepathy, Chaffin's also. Whatever is said about Squires will apply also to the other cases of the same type, and (although no certainty can now be reached) the Marteville and Milan cases may be parallel to Chaffin's. Others in which the telepathic explanation must be considered are Howe, F. R. C. P., and J. v. M.

It has already been suggested by several writers² that telepathy is from subconscious to subconscious. This agrees with Dunne's view³, according to which, if A is the agent and P the percipient,

¹ *Journal*, xx, 347.

² For instance, A. Glardon, *Journal*, ix, 9.

³ Note on telepathy in *The New Immortality* (1938).

the information is passed from A₁ to A₂, from A₂ to P₂, and finally from P₂ to P₁. We may therefore expect to find, on the one hand, four-dimensional effects—precognition or retrocognition; and on the other hand, evidence of subconscious activity on the part of agent and percipient.

Among the 'solution' dreams there are no cases of precognitive telepathy, which is not surprising, as will be seen if an attempt is made to devise a fictitious case. Retrocognitive cases, however, are comparatively common. They may be expressed diagrammatically as in Fig. 3.

BD represents a period of the agent's life, and CE the corresponding period in that of the percipient. At B the information becomes known (consciously or otherwise) to the agent; at E it appears in the consciousness of the percipient. Discussion of such cases¹ has hitherto turned largely on the question whether the telepathic message followed the path BCE, implying a latent period




Fig. 3

in the percipient's mind, or the path BDE. In the Chaffin case the agent dies at the point X, and the BDE path therefore implies the hypothesis of survival. But if it is conceded that both parties to the telepathy perceive four-dimensionally, then the time in which the telepathy occurs is Time 2, and the discussion loses its point. To ask whether the communication was sent before or after Chaffin's death is meaningless, since the death is not an event in Time 2; one might as well ask whether Euston station happens before or after six o'clock. There is, of course, a sense in which the terminus is an event to a railway passenger; but the ending of his career as a passenger does not affect his existence as a human being; similarly, the arrival of Chaffin 1 at the end of his journey does not imply the extinction of Chaffin 2. In the same way, the idea of a 'latent period' refers to Time 1, and has no application to Time 2.

Turning to the question of subconscious activity, we find that there is no difficulty at the percipient's end. In every case he experiences a dream or a hallucination, which is unquestionable evidence of such activity. The agent's part must be examined in

¹ e.g. *Proc.*, xl and xlv, 'Is Proof of Survival Possible?'

more detail. In the Squires type, the information was never known to the conscious mind of the agent ; if these cases are telepathic at all this information must have been present subconsciously. In the Marteville type the information was consciously known to the agent before his death, and in each case he had the opportunity to pass it on to the percipient by normal means. Why did he not do so? Either he forgot, or he wished to conceal it. M. de Marteville, a methodical man of business, would not have left a receipt for a large amount lying out of its proper place unless he had forgotten or lost it. Chaffin's is a case of concealment, and here a curious internal struggle may be observed. 'Chaffin A' draws up a will ; 'Chaffin B' makes another contradicting the first. 'A' contrives that the later will is unwitnessed, and hides it away; 'B' writes out a clue to the hiding-place ; 'A' conceals the clue. There is ample evidence here of a suppressed wish, which may easily have sunk into the subconscious.¹

In the remaining two cases the identity of the agent is unknown. F. R. C. P.'s is put down to the landlord ; but this gentleman possesses no qualifications for the part beyond the fact that he knew of his own intention to return late. There is another person in the case who was in a good position to know this, and also to know the doctor's problem ; who was vitally interested, and who can easily be supposed to have a repressed desire to communicate the information—the delirious patient, struggling against her craving.

In Howe's case there are three possible agents—the two Chaffes and R. M., the creditor. The last-named was well known to Judge Howe, but we have no details of their acquaintanceship ; of Chaffe senior we know only that he was dead. In connexion with Chaffe junior, however, we have an important point. He had sold the Judge a house. What price did he get for it? This question, irrelevant as it may appear, is perhaps the key to the problem. Let us suppose that the price was rather low. This explains, on Howe's side, the suppressed feeling that there must be a snag somewhere, which appears in the form of an anxiety dream. But what of Chaffe? He knows that there are no snags. Howe has a good bargain—too good a bargain. The old debt has been paid off—but suppose Howe thought it had not been paid off?

It will be objected that the train of thought I attribute to Chaffe is childishly spiteful. Such ideas would certainly find no place in

¹ What was the 'particular reason' which made Mr R—d's father employ a different lawyer for his purchase of the title-deeds? Why did Hennings's clergyman put the receipt in a secret drawer? There is something decidedly Chaffinesque about such behaviour, the reason for which, unfortunately, we shall never know.

his conscious mind ; but they are quite in keeping with the ways of thinking of the subconscious ; and the combination of paranormal powers with a childish mentality is encountered in many departments of psychical research.

In this and the preceding case the explanations have been largely speculative, but this does not affect the chief point, which is that in no case do we find on the part of the agent both conscious knowledge and a conscious desire to communicate it. The obstacle to communication is always psychological, never merely physical.

It may be concluded, then, that in the great majority of cases the essential information is derived from retrocognition, telepathy, or precognition. Chance coincidence is possible in the St Monica type, but clairvoyance is an unnecessary hypothesis,¹ and the idea of a spirit message as usually conceived is inapplicable.

I have now surveyed all the various types of 'solution' dream, with the exception of that which at first sight seems the easiest to explain—the purely intellectual problem, such as those of Lamberton and Hilprecht. In the cases hitherto discussed, the dreaming mind has been called upon for a momentary effort of metrocognition, telepathy, or precognition. This is well within its capacity, as shown by many other cases ; but sustained logical thinking is quite another matter.

I do not deny that reasoning takes place in dreams ; but a distinction, not hitherto important, must now be drawn between the part of the mind that composes the dream—the 'dramatist'—and the part that watches the story as it unfolds—the 'spectator'.² The distinction is clear in most dreams ; a specially obvious case is that of dreams with surprise endings, as Stevenson³ and Greenwood⁴ have observed. The difference of character between these entities is often very striking, as in a dream of Havelock Ellis's⁵ ; ' . . . I dreamed that I was in a drawing-room and saw a beautiful and attractive woman with an unusually low evening dress entirely revealing the breasts ; then, between the breasts, three additional nipples appeared, and I realised in my dream that here was a case of supernumerary breasts of sufficient scientific interest to be carefully examined later on ; and then, as I gazed, I saw a number of little fleshy nipple-like protuberances on the

¹ There is of course, much evidence of clairvoyance in other situations : for instance, some of the Duke University experiments.

² In Dunne's terminology the 'dramatist' is Observer 2 and the 'spectator' Observer 3.

³ Essay on Dreams in *Across the Plains*, 1909.

⁴ *Imagination in Dreams*, 1894.

⁵ *The World of Dreams*, 1911.

body, and thereupon I realised that I was really looking at a case of the rare skin disease termed *molluscum fibrosum*.' Here the erotic propensity and the rapid, illogical transitions of the 'dramatist' are in strong contrast with the cool, detached, scientific attitude of the 'spectator'.

The 'spectator' reasons well, but cannot carry on a long train of thought because the 'facts' he has to go on—the dream images—are perpetually changing. The 'dramatist's' logic, where it can be recovered, is of a most primitive type. The very structure of a dream is based on the 'undistributed middle'. Thus, the reasoning behind Freud's dream of 'Uncle Joseph'¹ is (in part) as follows: (i) N. has been found not guilty of a crime, therefore N. is a criminal. (ii) My uncle Joseph was a criminal. (iii) Therefore N. is my uncle.

A poetic metaphor, it may be remarked, is also an undistributed middle; 'There is a garden in her face' is much the same sort of thing as 'N. is my uncle'. There is evidence of artistic ability in dreams—consider, in these very cases, the appropriateness of the Assyrian priest, and the economy of the hallucinatory diagram on the real blackboard—but not of sustained reasoning.

One would expect, then, that in 'solution' dreams only the starting-point would be provided by the 'dramatist'—that, for instance, in Lamberton's case (15) the dream-image would be a combination of the blackboard and the algebraical form of the problem; that the 'spectator' would then realize that the attack could be made along these lines; that the dreamer would wake with this idea, and proceed, in his waking hours, to the working-out. This does not happen. The dreamer is presented with a *fait accompli*, apparently the unaided work of the 'dramatist', and his waking task is merely to check the result.

But, if we leave aside these dreams, and a few other special types such as the battle-dream, we have an overwhelming mass of evidence as to the character and capacities of the 'dramatist'. It is naïve, childish, changeable, following associations of form rather than of idea, a lover of the obscene, erotic, coprolalic, violent, a phantast, sometimes nearly a poet, sometimes almost a maniac—and this even in the most chaste and the most intellectual of mankind. We are now asked to believe that this same entity, in Lamberton's case, set itself soberly to the task of drawing tangents, dropping perpendiculars, and the detailed working-out of a problem in geometry; and in Hilprecht's, to the laborious deciphering of an Assyrian inscription.

In this dilemma it may be helpful to refer to the 'lost-article' cases. It was found that the article was frequently seen in the

¹ *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 6th English edition, p. 143.

dream as at the time of finding, not that of losing. This could be accounted for as to the motive by wish-fulfilment, and as to the means by precognition. In the cases now being considered, we have an analogous effect, and the same motive ; may not the means, too, be the same?

This may appear far-fetched. But if Lamberton, *after solving his problem*, had had a dream vision of the completed figure ; or if Hilprecht had dreamed of the Assyrian priest *on the next night*, no one would have thought it strange. The remarkable thing about these dreams is their displacement in time. But this is the very definition of a precognitive dream.

If it be asked : when was the detailed work on the problem carried out? the answer is that it was done on the day after the dream. The case is in fact parallel to Wilmot's. The dreaming mind, by bringing together elements which the waking mind had failed to connect, gave the essential 'flash of inspiration' which made the solution possible ; the solution itself thus became a fixed point in the future, and this reacted on the dream, giving it its final form. But the interaction of dream and event did not stop here, for the working-out itself, owing to the interposition of the dream, became much less laborious, and was in fact reduced to a mere process of checking.

The motivation of the 'solution' dream is straightforward. The conscious and subconscious mind are here working in co-operation, and not, as so often, in opposition. The subject is concerned over his problem. He brings all his conscious faculties to bear on it, but without success. After a while he gives it up and 'puts it out of his mind'. The problem is thus handed over to the subliminal mind ; and it exerts *its* very different faculties—including retrocognition, precognition, and telepathy.

When playing tennis, you lose a ball. After much search you give it up, get another and go on with the game. Your dog meanwhile has been watching ; and some time later, when you have forgotten all about it, he comes frisking up with the lost ball in his mouth—having smelt it out.

The subliminal mind, too, must handle its material in its own way. It dramatises, symbolises, condenses, and distorts just as it does with any other waking experience. Sometimes it comes up (wagging its tail, as it were) with something quite inappropriate. Take the Howe case ; the conscious mind asks anxiously, 'Are there any unsettled claims on this property?' The dreaming mind responds by producing a claim that has been settled some time ago. Another example (though not a 'solution' dream) is the well-known Terriss case. Mr Lane, a subordinate actor, dreamed of the murder of Terriss, the star, the night before it happened.

Lane was Terriss's understudy. He must therefore, like all understudies, have been longing for his principal to fall ill, so that he could have a chance of making a name for himself. Probably he tried to repress these longings. In sleep, however, the dreaming mind set off in search of such a situation, and came back with the nearest it could find—Terriss's approaching murder. This, however, was not at all what Lane wanted, as of course the theatre was closed and did not re-open until a new star had been engaged.

The 'solution' dream may be classed among a series of mental processes which have the common feature that the attention is first concentrated and then relaxed. The simplest case—cited by William James¹—is the everyday one in which a forgotten word or name, for which one racks one's brains in vain, comes back 'of its own accord' some time later. From this we may pass to the solution of puzzles, and from them to scientific discovery and invention; in each of these the same sequence of mental events is found. Artistic inspiration is somewhat different, but may still be brought under the same formula. When Wordsworth saw the daffodils, his senses were keenly stimulated; his attention was directed strongly outwards. Later, lying on his couch 'in vacant or in pensive mood', the image recurred spontaneously, bringing with it the beginnings of a poem.

Finally, the most striking phenomenon of this class is undoubtedly religious conversion. The analogy between sudden conversion and the 'solution' dream is close. We have first a period of mental distress, often very severe and prolonged; during this time the problems of sin and salvation are unceasingly brooded over. Then there often intervenes a period of tranquillity during which the problem is put aside; finally, in a sudden uprush of subliminal energy, often accompanied by hallucinatory visions and voices, the answer is found. Whether, on such occasions, any objective information is brought up, is a question which can scarcely be discussed here. However this may be, the subject's problem is solved.

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, p. 205.

WATER DIVINING

SUMMARY OF AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN
P. A. ONGLEY AND J. C. MABY

WE give below a précis of articles by P. A. Ongley and J. C. Maby which appeared in the *Journal of the British Waterworks Association* (Vol. xxxi, August 1949, Vol. xxxii, April, June, October 1950).

P. A. Ongley, M.Sc., is a New Zealand research chemist. J. C. Maby, B.Sc., is a full-time water diviner who uses instrumental methods.

The first article 'Divining in New Zealand' is from Ongley's pen. He begins by quoting an opinion of Ellis in 1917 that dowsing had been thoroughly discredited. He then quotes the 1920 figures of the New South Wales Commission for Water Conservation and Irrigation :

	DIVINED		NOT DIVINED	
	No. sunk	%	No. sunk	%
1. Serviceable bores giving more than 100 gals. per hour	1,294	70.4	1,516	83.9
2. Serviceable bores giving less than 100 gals. per hour	185	10.1	96	5.3
3. Unserviceable bores	87	4.8	61	3.4
4. Absolute failures	269	14.7	133	7.4
Totals	1,835	100	1,806	100

In 1947 a well-borer was found negligent in that he did not take a diviner with him when inspecting a proposed well site. To condemn divining on inadequate evidence would be unfair. It is almost impossible to get comparative figures for the success of diviners and non-diviners in selecting well sites.

It is often claimed that where well A (undivined) went dry, well B (divined nearby) was successful. Ongley gives a diagram to show a possible explanation in terms of geology. Successful water divining is often due to common sense. Other claims depend on half-truths and deliberate untruths on the part of diviners ; an example is given of each.

Ongley's Experiments. Seventy-five New Zealand diviners were tested. They included clergymen, ex-nurses, motor-mechanics, mill-hands, farmers, etc. Ten were women. In all tests care was taken to test only what the diviner claimed to do. Rigorous control experiments were done to make sure : that (a) there were no 'interfering rays' ; (b) containers etc. did not cut off 'divinable

rays'; (c) there was enough material to be divined; (d) 'reminiscences' (divinable traces allegedly left behind when a substance is moved) could not account for wrong results.

Sixty diviners were divining for water, the remaining fifteen for miscellaneous substances. Some claimed to find only moving water, the rest to find water anywhere.

The first test was to see how accurately the diviner could locate the edge of an already divined stream on repetition. If his eyes were open the diviner always 'found' his 'stream' at the same place, but blindfold he would be up to ten feet out. In control tests blindfold normal subjects did rather better than the dowsers in locating a predetermined mark.

Four diviners were tested to see if they would declare pegs in the ground already dubbed by them as 'wet' or 'dry', to be in the same state on repeat attempts. Observed: 113 right in 210 trials (expected 105).

Ongley quotes instances of diviners contradicting each other in reporting streams crossing a given line. Diviners who could 'find' only running water were asked to tell whether a mains supply was on or off. Eight diviners scored 80 out of 170 (expected 85). Those who could only find static water were asked to tell water from an organic liquid or to say whether a bottle was full or empty. The 7 diviners so tested scored 116 out of 210 (expected 105). All the dowsers were badly astray about depth of water.

Examples of dowsing for miscellaneous objects are given. The results are described as 'ludicrous'.

'Although, unfortunately it has not been possible to test every diviner on all his claims, nevertheless each has conclusively been proved totally unreliable.' Digging wells on divined sites is impracticable and not as decisive as the results of so-called artificial tests, in defence of which may be noted that (1) diviners were asked to suggest tests; (2) in many cases, e.g. in identifying metals, these tests had been used by diviners themselves; (3) careful tests were always done to see that the tests were both fair to the diviner and foolproof; (4) one diviner said, 'Your tests are perfectly fair. Until I tried I would have bet £5 to a penny I would have been successful.'

Ongley also defends the blindfold tests. He concludes his article with a discussion of the mechanism of movement of the diviner's rod, and applies a mathematical treatment to the problem. He concludes that the bending of the rod is due to the unnatural position of the hands producing a torsional couple on it in a vertical plane.

Summarising, Ongley maintains that 75 diviners would have included some, at least, of the reliable diviners had any existed.

Secondly, '... the nuisance value and the menace of dowsing is not sufficiently realised. A water or mineral witcher can cause an awful waste of private and public money. The medical witcher can cause a waste of human life.'

Maby in his reply complains '... Ongley shows no sign of having properly examined the very large body of positive instrumental and physiological data, or the excellent records of a few accredited dowsters, before drawing dogmatic conclusions.'

Ongley is prejudiced; his intentions are sincere but misguided. Maby accepts his results, '... so far as they go, at their face value. But the matter does not end there, since a vast body of evidence by numerous competent engineers, physicists, physiologists and others has securely established the basic facts of radiesthesia and dowsing (excluding interfering psychological factors) in recent years, despite the negative results of Ongley, Macfayden and one or two other sceptics.'

Neuro-muscular reflexes to living organisms etc. can be demonstrated in the laboratory (Maby refers to Tromp's *Psychical Physics* and to Maby and Franklin's *Physics of the Divining Rod*), yet 'the practical application of dowsing reflexes in accurate surveys and analyses is problematical'.

'There have never been more than a few tolerably expert, self-critical, reliable diviners in any one country.' Maby agrees with Ongley that enthusiastic amateurs have a high nuisance value. This does not disprove true dowsing, cf. the work of Tromp, Pericas, De Vita, Von Pohl, Dannert, Regnault, Jemma, Gorceix, Chicca, Creyke, Budgett, Turenne, Maby, Franklin, and others; also the commercial success over years of Pericas, De Vita, Creyke, Franklin, and Maby.

There is nothing supernatural about genuine divining. [Maby belongs to the school of thought which holds that dowsing is solely physico-physiological and not psychic.] Modern dowsing has shown that there are many complicating physical factors to contend with: 'Hence the frequent errors and misinterpretations of quite objective physical effects by both dowsters and instruments used.' Few dowsters realize these sources of error. Examination of a mixed bag of dowsters and sites is useless. Genuine successes will be lost in a 'jungle of guesswork, auto-suggestion and chance coincidence... In any case, geological conditions should be taken into account... one must be sure that: (a) a really competent dowster is employed; (b) he works under fair and proper conditions, free from geophysical, meteorological, physiological and even psychological sources of interference...'

In conclusion Maby says Ongley has shown that New Zealand

dowsers have no commercial value. He cannot accept that all dowsing is unreliable as the reverse has been proved many times. Dowsers should be more cautious and self-critical and follow the precepts of Tromp, Franklin, and Maby. The general public should be more objective in its approach, scientists and engineers less prejudiced.

In his second article Ongley replies that in fact he is quite familiar with the classical literature on dowsing, and with Maby's book and papers. He repeats his contention that many of the 'excellent records' of dowsers are due to half-truths and untruths. Ongley does not agree that he only tested duds, contending that he tested all comers; among the 75 there should surely have been some of ability. All care was taken to see that no diviner attempted anything beyond his alleged powers and that all tests were both fair and foolproof.

In a six-page paper he had no room for detailed results. These are described more fully in the *New Zealand Journal of Science and Technology*, 1949, 30B, pp. 38-54. Ongley concludes with a challenge: 'I am willing to go anywhere to meet up to say half-a-dozen diviners in the field on the following conditions: (i) I am able to come from and return to Glasgow within the weekend; (ii) Before we start trials we agree on what we are going to try to do . . . (iii) [not relevant to this précis]; (iv) If the diviners are unable to substantiate their claims, I would expect a refund of travelling expenses.'

Maby, in his second article, says Ongley is clearly fixed in his views though otherwise fair; he again recommends studying the literature, watching a good commercial dowser at work, and asking for his records of a typical year's working, e.g. some of Maby's own results which he gave in the *Journal* of the British Society of Dowsers for March, 1949.

In fairly homogeneous strata, average weather, open rural country, and absence of thick clay or shale beds, depths can often be predicted to one per cent and yields to ten per cent. The reverse conditions may lead to serious errors. There is no question of '... "clairvoyant perception"', but merely a straightforward electrical and geophysical routine (incorporating both the divining rod and a few simple electromagnetic accessories) as roughly described in *The Physics of the Divining Rod*'. But errors arise readily from complicating physical and even psychological factors.

Ongley assumes undue authority because he is a *chemist*, not a physiologist or geophysicist or electronic engineer. Many very

eminent physicists, physiologists, doctors, and engineers have already agreed to both the main facts and also some of the tentative explanations of dowsing.

Moreover, tests of the type Ongley carried out require both a special technique and a very considerable knowledge of human psychology. Sceptics or hostile investigators invariably cause failure because of the psycho-radiant output of short waves from their bodies which can be picked up by dowsers and by certain new electro-mechanical detectors. Perhaps Ongley is an inhibitor.

Maby is unable to accept Ongley's challenge because (i) 'there are too many . . . almost threatening conditions attached' ; (ii) he and other experts are too busy ; and (iii) there is ample positive evidence on record. Anyhow, what would be the use of convincing Ongley, whose verdict would not be likely to result in universal acceptance?

The exchange of views concludes with a rejoinder from Ongley, who claims that, like many others before him, he has investigated dowsing as fully as the diviners would allow him. 'there is not a shred of unequivocal evidence in favour of divining . . . In contrast to the formidable literature that has accumulated against divining the only reputable literature that might possibly be interpreted as favourable to the art is the paper of Barrett who, after meandering indecisively for 250 pages, concludes by saying more or less that he does not know what to think. That Maby needs to rely on this 50-year-old paper as his mainstay is in itself sufficient condemnation.'

Ongley quotes Barrett in support of his views that a dowser's own records cannot be relied upon. The 'eminent physicists, physiologists, doctors and engineers' supporting dowsing exist only in Maby's imagination. If they do exist it proves nothing. 'In science, what count are not authority, but facts, and the logic of the conclusions drawn from these.' Ongley says that although a chemist, he has a working knowledge of physics, biology, physiology, and statistics, and has had the assistance of expert geologists, physicists, medical men, farmers, and well-borers. As an ex-teacher he probably knows all that is needed about setting examinations and handling examinees. Maby's excuses for not accepting his challenge are so farcical as not to need rebuttal. Evidence for dowsing should not comprise statements of prowess, but actual results in foolproof tests in the presence of impartial observers. If Maby and the dowsers are unwilling to supply the evidence one can only assume they cannot.

REVIEWS

HOMO FABER : A Study of Man's Mental Evolution. By G. N. M. Tyrrell. London, Methuen, 1951. viii, 205 pp. 15s.

Mr Tyrrell here defends and extols the fundamental importance to modern man of a broad comprehensive *non-specialist* approach to the problem of his own nature and place in the universe. Science, he believes, represents progressive specialization in techniques for the control of the material world, with a resulting mastery of *immediate* reality and an increasingly hopeless removal from the apprehension of *ultimate* reality.

The philosophical tools employed in this analysis are derived largely from Bergson and from Eddington. It is Bergson's *Homo Faber* in the *Creative Evolution*, with a mind structured by the adaptive necessity to cope with the physical world, who supplies the title ; and who also supplies much of the groundwork for the description of a practical mind working, in geometrical and mechanical terms, to master the practical obstacles which material Nature presents. It is Eddington's brilliant description of the scientists' dilemma (in the *Philosophy of Physical Science*) that guides Mr Tyrrell through the epistemological quicksands of modern positivism. From Bergson we learn that our minds were evolved to *act*, not to *grasp ultimate realities* ; and from Eddington we learn (if Kant had not already persuaded us) that the objective and the mathematical take on a certain form and present a certain solid façade of unquestionable truth because we have in the first place determined, by the very structure of our minds, what manner of things there are in the world. Truths which belong to this objective system are 'convergent', and can be brought into more and more refined formulation ; those which transcend it lead to 'divergent' difficulties, out of range of Homo Faber's sight, which 'paralyse the mind and dishearten it' (p. 58).

In the light of this analysis, physical science, biological science, and psychology can all win tactical success against immediate local objectives, and philosophy can achieve rationalistic successes through improved clarification of terms ; but all specializations lead us away from the intuitive grasp of our own natures and of the cosmos to which we belong. Specialization actually tends, Mr Tyrrell believes, to disturb our capacity for self-understanding and self-fulfilment.

In reading these earnest arguments from a man of such highly specialized and such brilliantly creative analytic powers, the reviewer confesses to a considerable bewilderment. Mr Tyrrell's ingenious experiments in paranormal perception exemplify all the characteristics of the astute planner and controller of the conditions

under which a fact has to be observed if it is to be known to exist ; all of Homo Faber's adaptive resourcefulness was poured into them. It is not true that he concerned himself as scientist only with the external and objective phases of his subject's mind ; he was just as much a specialist when he was considering subjective as he was in considering objective aspects of his problem. He is the same Mr Tyrrell who gave us the magnificent study *Apparitions*, involving a highly disciplined and highly specialized study of very complex and bewildering psychological phenomena, including the analysis of unconscious dynamics and interpersonal interactions. Is it just possible that Mr Tyrrell in the present volume is not really attacking the *specialist* at all, but the dogmatic materialist who uses the sciences as weapons in his ideological battle?

Perhaps this short volume is not the place for me to hope for an answer to my difficulties, but I am also worried by the lack of definition of two terms which are central in the present effort : instinct and intuition. Throughout the book the innate predisposition to observe and to think in a given manner (a predisposition to which traditionally the term 'intuition' has sometimes been applied) is referred to as an instinct ; we even learn that those who uncritically hold to such an instinct 'will go on holding it, just as birds will go on building nests and rabbits will go on digging holes' (p. 173). On the other hand the term intuition is applied to a process transcending the sensory processes (and apparently also the ordinary rational operations) ; it is compared with religious and at times with creative activities in such a way as to suggest that these are vehicles by which it is carried ; it is said to carry us to a kind of self-understanding which will free us from the specialist's errors ; but it remains undefined. Light on the process is, despite all this, shed in some degree by reference to Indian mysticism ; and I must confess that Mr Tyrrell has done much to convince me that we need far more competent and thorough studies of Indian practices than we have, by specialists who are themselves in the thick of the phenomena, deeply sympathetic and capable of identifying with the adepts, and also equipped with tools for careful observation and analysis. I am sure that if I could talk with Mr Tyrrell he would agree. It is surely not the specialist that he decries, but the specialist who specialises before he exposes himself to the ABCs of human nature, in which always much of the non-geometrical is found.

The trouble with the reviewer is very likely the fact that he is a sort of a specialist. His own bias is to think that Mr Tyrrell really believes in organized specialized science just as much as he himself does, and that time will bring him back to another series of

brilliant contributions to psychical research, in the best tradition of science, with all the appurtenances of Homo Faber's analytic mind and all the humanity of one who can see deeply into *The Personality of Man*. Let Mr Tyrrell, and all good psychical researchers, go on attacking the stupid and narrow specialists, but outspecialise them all in the technical competence of their observation and their analyses!

GARDNER MURPHY

NEW APPROACHES TO DREAM INTERPRETATION. By Nandor Fodor. New York, Citadel Press, 1951. xvi, 363 pp. \$5.00

Dr Nandor Fodor was at one time a well-known figure in the field of psychical research—though, so far as the present reviewer is aware, he was never actively connected with the S.P.R. In more recent years he has turned to psycho-analysis, and he can now speak of 'my psychical research days' as being of the past. Nevertheless his interest in what might be called borderline phenomena has persisted, and in the new field has manifested itself in a considerable preoccupation with some of the more mysterious problems which present themselves to the psycho-analyst, so that he has to some extent constituted himself a liaison officer, calling attention on the one hand to the possible importance to the psycho-analyst of certain recognized problems in parapsychology and on the other to the interest which some of the more curious phenomena revealed by psycho-analysis might quite naturally present to the student of psychical research.

As regards the first he justifiably reminds psycho-analysts that (with a very few exceptions) they have not followed up Freud's own suggestion that psycho-analysis 'has prepared the way for the acceptance of such phenomena as telepathy'. Like Freud himself, Fodor is inclined to believe that telepathy manifests itself between the unconscious minds of the persons concerned and that this accounts for much of the apparently erratic and elusive nature of the relevant phenomena, which makes them often so exasperatingly unamenable to experimental or other conditions imposed by conscious intention. Being by its nature an affair of the unconscious, telepathy also partakes of the other characteristics of unconscious mental processes as revealed by psycho-analysis. As with dreams and other mental events largely affected by the unconscious, the 'meaning' of telepathic impressions is frequently not immediately obvious to the conscious mind and may require interpretation' of the kind familiar in psycho-analysis—and therefore sometimes apparently fantastic or 'far-fetched' in its

nature—before the full extent and nature of the telepathic occurrence becomes clear.

This process of interpretation, however, naturally increases the difficulty of scientific proof, since (as with psycho-analytic interpretations generally) there is often room for doubt as to whether the interpretation in any given case is correct or adequate. The author's own interpretations in this book range from those which would be acceptable to almost anybody who is willing to grant that a symbolic process is at work to others as regards which even many fellow psycho-analysts might be sceptical, especially as, in the interest of speeding up the therapeutic and interpretative process, Dr Fodor is admittedly prone to a somewhat active interference with the analysand's associations.

In the present book the author deals (amidst much other material) with some twenty cases in which telepathy seems to have manifested itself in the dreams of two or more subjects, usually but not always on the same night, a number of them occurring during or in connection with psycho-analytic treatment. Some of these are striking, there being in one case no less than eight 'elements in common' between the 'shared dreams'. In another pair of dreams it would seem that the cognitive content had got dissociated from its affective context, so that one dreamer can subsequently say to another: 'You were not afraid of the fire. You could afford it, because I got your fear' (p. 198). Displacement of affect is of course well known in psycho-analysis since its early days, but here the displacement is from one dreamer to another. As one criterion of telepathic influence in dreams, the author suggests that a 'shared dream' cannot be adequately explained or interpreted even by the most assiduous psycho-analytic procedures unless the corresponding dream of the other person is taken into account. But as to the circumstances which tend to produce such 'shared dreams' he is cautiously reticent, except for suggesting that there may be present some element of sympathy or 'need for companionship, for sharing warmth and affection, as well as the need for protection and reassurance in the case of fear and anxiety' (p. 203).

In the absence of some compelling or quantitative criterion (such as can usually only be supplied by rigorous experimental procedure) readers' judgment concerning the evidence submitted will inevitably vary, but it can certainly be said that the author has here provided a good *prima facie* case for further investigation along these lines. Furthermore, his data suggest the reflection that, if telepathic dreams occur, they would in the vast majority of instances be overlooked, so that there would seem to be a strong case for a detailed comparison of dreams over a given period as

between persons possessing some common bond which might seem to make their occurrence likely. (Would that we knew more about the nature of such common bond!) Ideally, perhaps, these dreams should in the first place be submitted to some third person with a knowledge of the personalities and circumstances of the two dreamers, with psycho-analytic training and with opportunity for interviewing them when necessary. The introduction of such a third person, though in practice it might often be far from easy, might reduce difficulties arising from the dreamers' own 'resistances' and at the same time minimise the dangers of mutual suggestion during subsequent discussion, such as is almost bound to occur if the dreams are first discussed and 'interpreted' by the dreamers themselves. Some further description of the author's own precautions to avoid such suggestive influences would in certain cases have been welcome.

Dr Fodor also believes in the reality of 'prophetic' dreams, though here the evidence presented is less extensive. As in the case of 'shared dreams', psycho-analytic interpretation is usually necessary. Thus in a dream of his own he contends that there is precognition of a quite unanticipated outcome of a libel action. To mention the most impressive element, he dreamt that he was presented with £4 for a suit (of clothes), with which sum he was dissatisfied, as he expected the suit would cost £8 (this was early in 1939). In the subsequent (law)suit, the judge quite unexpectedly divided the grounds of libel into four groups. The jury found libel on two of these counts, but not on the other two, whereupon the judge divided the costs, so that Dr Fodor received only half of the full cost of his 'suit' (p. 314).

In the other of the two fields in which, as was suggested above, Dr Fodor has constituted himself a sort of liaison officer, he is particularly concerned with the influence of birth and intra-uterine fantasies and the anxieties connected with them. In this he follows up the theme of his earlier volume *The Search for the Beloved*. Ever since Freud first pointed out the existence of dreams and fantasies of this kind, they have constituted a problem which most psycho-analysts seem to have been shy in tackling. Otto Rank's book *The Trauma of Birth*, which appeared in 1924, has been cold-shouldered as supposedly guilty of exaggeration and as manifesting a flight from the more plausible and more easily verifiable factors of later life revealed as important by psycho-analysts. The possible influence of the birth trauma is complicated by the fact that birth fantasies are undoubtedly used to symbolise (perhaps we should say to conceal or cover) incestuous tendencies connected with the Oedipus complex or indeed sexual or other desires of a more general nature (the latter including the

widespread notion of 'spiritual rebirth'). Dr Fodor recognizes the reality of this tendency (which he calls 'retrojection'), but nevertheless is firm in his insistence on the importance of birth fantasies in their own right and maintains that genuine birth dreams can often be detected by an element of 'fatality' (in the sense that something *must* be done), finding a further justification in the therapeutic success in his hands of what he calls 'birth therapy'.

When we turn to the other obstacle to the serious treatment of birth fantasies, which lies in the difficulty of imagining that we can have any memory of our own individual birth, the author falls back on the admittedly vague concepts of 'organismic mind' and 'organismic memory', which he holds can produce fantasies which have a rough but real resemblance to the actual biological facts of the birth process, even though the symbolism makes use of the most varied elements of experience from later life. In judging this position we must remember that Jung has insisted upon the existence of psychic 'archetypes' and that Freud held, though perhaps more hesitatingly, a similar view as regards certain primal fantasies—both of which were supposedly independent of what we ordinarily recognize as individual memories and which might seem to be mediated by what might not unreasonably be called organismic mind. We recognize that anatomical and physiological development both in man and animals is determined by hereditary or 'organismic' tendencies, that reflex and instinctive behaviour is similarly determined, but we boggle at the notion of conscious *ideas* (as distinct from conative *tendencies*) having a parallel origin. If Jung is right (not that Dr Fodor makes any appeal to Jung) this attitude is unjustified, and if we grant that fantasies may sometimes be determined by what we might broadly term racial memories, then there is *a fortiori* also a case for some dim kind of memory underlying birth and uterine fantasies, for they at least correspond to events or states which have undoubtedly occurred in the *individual* life, even though they belong to a period usually covered by the deepest infantile amnesia. What is badly needed here is some attempt to correlate the nature or vividness of natal or prenatal fantasies with the actual individual history of birth or gestation. Some thirty years ago the present reviewer (in *The Psycho-Analytic Study of the Family*, 1921) suggested a line of research which might possibly throw light upon the subject, but in the interval neither he nor any other investigator has been enterprising enough to face the difficulties (including the difficulty of incredulity) involved. At least two cases mentioned by Dr Fodor appear to show the existence of such a correlation: the first, a patient whose (neurotic) pains in the navel were associated

with a clumsy tying of the umbilical cord, the second that of a patient whose nightmares of strangling were connected with the fact that she was born with the cord tightly wound round her neck. In both these cases the patients had been told of these conditions attending their birth, and this subsequent information may have been the sole factor in producing the mental phenomena observed ; on the other hand it may just possibly have acted merely as a reinforcing agent, and taken as a whole Dr Fodor's data certainly strengthen the case for taking the 'birth trauma' seriously, whatever may be its origin, and for studying it by all methods which may be available.

Not content with the fantasies of birth and of the prenatal state, Dr Fodor goes further in suggesting what he calls fantasies of the pre-maternal state and the trauma of conception. In some of what he says under this heading he was interestingly anticipated by Herbert Silberer who in 1912 (*Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische und Psychopathologische Forschungen*, iv, 141) called attention to the occurrence of 'spermatozoa dreams', which he thought might symbolise a desire for impregnation (the dreamer had a knowledge of biology) but which also, according to him, involved a desire for 'infinite regression', including return to the *father's* body, much as in some of Dr Fodor's interpretations (though the latter author does not actually refer to this anticipation of his views). Dr Fodor is no more afraid of facing an element of mysticism than was Silberer in an earlier psycho-analytic generation, though he admits that such pre-maternal fantasies (insofar as they are anything more than mere biologically interpreted fantasies expressing the common idea of life before conception or incarnation) 'must be so alien to our comprehension as to defy all attempts at verbal expression. In feelings we may rise into it [pre-maternal existence] but we may not be able to translate this feeling into knowledge. . . . As to the reality of such existence science has nothing to offer' (p. 94).

There are various other aspects of the present work (the several chapters of which originally appeared in article form in various periodicals between 1942 and 1951) which are of interest primarily to the psycho-analyst or psychopathologist. Among these is a very striking account of some cases of long-persistent hysterical colour blindness which yielded rapidly to psychological treatment. We should mention, further, the author's interesting discussion of the unconscious significance of numbers, which is probably the most complete which has yet been attempted. The contrast between the conscious (or perhaps we should say 'realistic') mathematical treatment of numbers which are regarded as entirely abstract and the unconscious treatment which immediately invests

them with some concrete meaning (often of a 'magical' and extremely fantastic kind) is here particularly impressive and is well calculated to bring out the special peculiarities of 'autistic thinking' (e.g. 15 = house or home, because 15 minutes = a quarter of an hour, and 'quarters' = living quarters, (p. 218); or again, in what the author calls the 'evocation of the undreamt', when the significant number may, for example, be obtained by subtraction, as when '24 and 100' = 'independence', because $100 - 24 = 76$, and 1776 is the date of the Declaration of Independence (though the figure 76 itself never enters consciousness), (p. 348).

As the author says, 'logically or illogically the unconscious may stop at nothing in search of meaning' (p. 263), and he reminds us in this connection of the one-time humorous description of the sexologist Baron Schrenck von Notzing as 'Baron Shrink from Notzing (nothing)'. Some interesting examples are given of such unconscious processes which have found their way into the conscious mind and there become superstitions which have exercised a potent influence on belief and behaviour. This raises the disquieting question how far psycho-analytic or parapsychological interpretations (including some of the author himself) may represent similar irruptions of the unconscious into our would-be scientific attitudes and findings. The question has to be faced, but should not deter us from a due scientific regard for the real influence of the unconscious on many (we hardly know yet how many) of the difficult problems with which psychical research is concerned.

J. C. FLUGEL

THE GREEKS AND THE IRRATIONAL. By E. R. Dodds. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press; London, Cambridge University Press, 1951. ix, 327 pp. 37s. 6d.

The purpose of this book, which is the outcome of lectures delivered in 1949 at Berkeley, California, is to consider whether the Greeks were 'in fact quite so blind to the importance of non-rational factors in man's experience and behaviour as is commonly assumed both by their apologists and by their critics'. The author's conclusion is that they were *not*. The book should be considered primarily as a contribution to classical scholarship, and has little direct bearing on the problems of modern psychical research, but there is much in it that will interest the student of these problems.

A chapter on 'The Blessings of Madness' includes a discussion on 'Prophetic Madness' as exemplified by the Pythian priestess at Delphi, into whom, it was alleged, the God Apollo entered and

used her vocal organs in the same way that 'the so-called "control" does in modern spirit mediumship', and there is also (p. 71) an account of 'belly-talkers'. It would appear that these people went into trance during which a hoarse 'belly-voice', assumed to be that of a 'daemon', was heard issuing from their lips. The analogy with the 'direct voice' of modern days is obvious.

In the chapter on 'Dream-Pattern and Culture-Pattern' Professor Dodds explains (p. 103) that he is mainly concerned not with the dream-experience of the Greeks, but with their attitude to dream-experience, but he points out that we may have to reckon with variations in the character of the experience itself: 'In many primitive societies there are types of dream-structure which depend on a socially transmitted pattern of belief, and cease to occur when that belief ceases to be entertained'. He quotes a statement by Jung that a medicine-man had confessed to him that 'he no longer had any dreams, for they had the District Commissioner now instead'. The chapter includes an account of the various methods, mainly incubation, used to induce 'divine', that is, significant dreams, as opposed to non-significant dreams. The practice of incubation still persists among the Greek peasants of today. The Hippocratic treatise *On Regimen* (p. 119) relates many dreams to the physiological state of the dreamer, which they express in symbolic form. Although the fourth-century author's interpretation of these symbols would not be accepted today, it is interesting to find him to this extent foreshadowing Freud, whom he also anticipates in accepting 'the principle that the dream is always egocentric'.

In Appendix I on 'Maenadism' there is an account of the Oreibasia, the mountain dance, which seems to have originated as a means of inducing religious experience and ecstasy; dancing as a means to this end has many parallels. 'The ritual oreibasia at a fixed date may have originally developed out of spontaneous attacks of mass hysteria. By canalising such hysteria in an organised rite once in two years, the Dionysiac cult kept it within bounds and gave it a relatively harmless outlet' (p. 272).

Appendix II contains an account of Theurgy, about which much is still obscure. The practice would seem, however, to have involved in some cases the employment of a trance medium. Sometimes the trance would be a light one, the medium's consciousness still persisting; sometimes it would be deep, resembling apparently the trance observed in Mrs Piper's mediumship. The phenomena alleged to occur in the presence of these Theurgists offer many analogies to the phenomena associated with modern Spiritualism, paranormal knowledge, elongation and possibly levitation of the medium's body, luminous forms and apparitions

seen entering and leaving his body, with which we may compare 'the so-called "ectoplasm" or "teleplasm", which modern observers claim to have seen emerge from and return to the bodies of certain mediums'.

H. DE G. S.

JOURNAL OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press. \$1.50

VOL. 15, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 1951.

In an editorial article, Professor Rhine discusses the outlook in parapsychology. He notes the signs of maturity in parapsychological experimentation and its consequent increasing technicality. Of future trends, he prophesies increasing use of spontaneous cases for giving fresh orientation in experimental work and increased integration with neurophysiological and biological researches.

Mrs Rhine, in an article on 'Conviction and Associated Conditions in Spontaneous Cases', points out some of the differences between spontaneous cases of psi knowing and the experimental results of card-guessing experiments, particularly the fact that the former are very often accompanied by a conviction that the percipient knows that the experience he is getting is giving him information about a real event.

An article on 'ESP Performance and Target Sequence' by S. G. Soal and J. G. Pratt contains an account of a new analysis of a series of 33,500 ESP trials by Mrs Stewart in which the attempt is made to discover whether there is any relationship between success and the pattern of target sequences. Highly significant relationships were found.

Professor Broad reviews a symposium by three philosophers on the relevance of psychical research to philosophy. He agrees that philosophers may make a useful contribution to parapsychology by analysing its terminology, but suggests that they should prepare themselves for this task by a careful study of the relevant literature.

VOL. 15, NO. 4, DECEMBER 1951.

In an article on 'The Present Outlook on the Question of Psi in Animals', Professor Rhine makes a wide and well-documented study of the research done in this field and of its unsolved problems. He deals with investigations that are being made of migratory and homing behaviour in birds, and of experimental work on homing in mice. He also points to the very considerable body of evidence on spontaneous homing behaviour in dogs and cats, and the still more puzzling cases of trailing behaviour in which families have travelled to a distance by car or train and found that their pets which were left behind have turned up at their new homes.

In an article on 'Introversion-Extraversion Ratings in Relation to Scores in ESP Tests', Dr Betty Humphrey finds a significant difference between the psi scoring of those who are rated as extraverts by the Bernreuter Personality Inventory and those who are rated as introverts, the former scoring positively and the latter negatively. It would be interesting to know whether this is an intrinsic difference in introverted subjects or whether it is determined by the personality type of the experimenter. It is possible that an introverted experimenter might find that his introverts scored positively and his extraverts negatively.

A minor article by Paul and Christiane Vasse compares the scoring rate of these two experimenters in PK tests. C.V. showed significant positive effects while P.V. scored at chance level. A previous study had suggested that C.V. was successful in influencing the rate of germination of seeds while P.V. was less so.

In 'An Experimental Study of ESP Capacity in Mental Patients' by K. E. Bates and Marietta Newton, it is reported that although co-operative patients scored better than those who were non-co-operative, there were no significant differences found between patients suffering from different mental disorders. The experiment seems to have been of somewhat defective design since differences were calculated only between total scores of different classes of patients, instead of separate patients being treated as individuals in a contingency table.

This number of the *Journal* concludes with 'Reflections on Parapsychology, Psycho-analysis, and Atomic Physics' by Professor P. Jordan, the German physicist, and a review by Professor Ducasse of Mr Moncrieff's book *The Clairvoyant Theory of Perception*.

VOL. 16, No. 1, MARCH 1952.

The Editorial by Professor Rhine is a discussion of the present position of our knowledge about dowsing. It contains an informative account of experimental work in the past with valuable suggestions of how it may be made more fruitful in the future.

Esther Foster gives an account of ESP experiments in which (as in guessing playing cards) there is more than one aspect of the target object on which success can be obtained. The problem is whether there is a tendency in successful experiments to score separately on the different aspects or whether success means that the card is guessed right as a whole. In most experiments it appears that the card is guessed right as a whole, but there are indications in one experiment that the subject may be more successful in some aspects than in others.

An address on 'Thought Transference and Related Phenomena' given by R. H. Thouless to the Royal Institution in 1950 is reprinted from the *Proceedings* of the Royal Institution.

A minor article of great interest and importance is contributed by Miss E. A. G. Knowles on a psi effect obtained in stopping a manually operated random selector in a determined position when the apparatus is not seen by the operator. She points out that this is an operation of a different character from that ordinarily covered by the term PK, and suggests that it should be provisionally labelled PD (psi dexterity). She also points out that PD may enter into success with dice when these are thrown manually.

A placement PK experiment by H. Forwald, following a highly successful experiment reported earlier, did not yield significant deviations from mean chance expectation. The combined result of the two series remains, however, highly significant.

R. H. THOULESS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

Vol. 46, No. 2, April 1952. New York, A.S.P.R., \$1.50.

In 'Current Developments in Psychical Research', Dr Gardner Murphy reviews modern trends and feels that real progress is being made in the field of extrasensory perception. He makes a six-part appeal to members of the A.S.P.R. which our own members would do well to heed : (1) To record every spontaneous case that comes their way ; (2) to take part in home experiments ; (3) to contribute financially ; (4) to let others know about the aims and work of the Society ; (5) to come to meetings or form Study Groups ; (6) '... you can always ask questions which will put a bee in our bonnet...'. There is nothing more glib, more garrulous, and more hopeless than a research man who thinks he can get along without other people's suggestions. It is a completely nonsensical idea... What we research people want is to be understood, to be helped... to be criticized. We want to be told what we should do that we are not doing, and told how we should do it. If you know of sensitives, if you know of methods, if you know of problems, let us hear about them ; let's find a way. Let's do the best we can do in a group enterprise.'

J. L. Woodruff and Mrs L. A. Dale present a report on a study of the relationship between ESP function and the psychogalvanic response. The results were disappointing.

W. H. W. Sabine stresses the value of reports of spontaneous precognition. He suggests that selected remarkable cases 'will not help so much in its study as a number of cases, however trivial the circumstances, which have happened to the same

individual, provided always that he is capable of exact observation and narration.'

An elaborate PK research is being carried out by Dale and Woodruff using the rotating cage with camera with which Professor Robert McConnell, of the Physics Department of the University of Pittsburgh, is said to have achieved spectacular results.

D. P.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE DIEPPE RAID CASE

SIR,—The statements made by D. and A. in The Dieppe Raid Case contain unusual features and are in certain respects ambiguous.

(a) Until A. had returned to the room (assuming A. was absent from the room for 5 minutes) neither A. nor D. had mentioned to the other the noises that they had heard for 15 minutes.

(b) There is no conclusive evidence that A. continued to hear those noises during the 5 minutes that she was absent from the room. If she did not, what significance (if any) should attach thereto? There is no evidence that A. suddenly (or otherwise) ceased to hear those noises upon leaving the room and suddenly (or otherwise) commenced to hear those noises upon returning to the room. If she did, what significance (if any) should attach thereto?

(c) There is no conclusive evidence (apart from the fact that in their respective statements D. says that she had been listening to it 'for about 20 minutes' and A. says that she had been listening to it 'for about 15 minutes') whether D. continued to hear those noises during the 5 minutes that A. was absent from the room.

(d) There is no evidence (apart from the fact that in her statement D. says that 'A. said she had also been listening to it for about 20 minutes') whether D. or A. (and at what time) first mentioned to the other the length of time that D. or A. had heard those noises.

(e) Although A. in her statement says that she had been listening to the noises 'for about 15 minutes' D. in her statement says that 'A. said she had also been listening to it for about 20 minutes'. When did A. make this observation to D.?

(f) If it is correct that D. and A. had heard those noises for 20 minutes and 15 minutes respectively, before A. left the room, how is the discrepancy of 5 minutes accounted for?

(g) Since it is not known for how long D. had been awake, D. may have been mistaken when she says that she 'woke up before it started'. While A. suggests (unless her awakening and the commencement of the noises were coincidental) that she (A.) was awakened by such noises, it may be (although such noises may have commenced in the sense that had A. been awake she would have recognised them) that she was not.

(h) Is there any evidence that D. and A. (alone or jointly) had recently attended a film of, or discussed with others, the Dieppe landing, or some other subject that might be suggestive thereof? Whether such evidence is, or is not, available, it is apparent from the nature of the statements made by D. and A. and from the fact that D. and A. occupied the same room, when they heard those noises, that collaboration cannot be excluded.

DENIS CHESTERS

SIR,—The Dieppe Raid Case, investigated by G. W. Lambert and Kathleen Gay, must recall to the minds of many the case of *An Adventure*, in which also anonymity was, at the outset, preferred by the percipients. In both cases the hallucinatory experience occurred to two English ladies while on a holiday in France. Both dates were in the month of August, and on a Saturday (August 10, 1901, and August 4, 1951). The Dieppe Raid case was, indeed, almost on the fiftieth anniversary of the Trianon one. In both cases additional experiences were reported by one only of the percipients: Mrs Dorothy Norton in the one case, Miss Jourdain in the other.

A less obvious but very important point of resemblance arises out of the possession by Mrs Dorothy Norton and Miss Agnes Norton of a guide book entitled *Dieppe*. Mr Lambert appears to have shown satisfactorily that the information about the raid in this guide book could account for but a small part of the knowledge evinced by the percipients in their statements; and moreover they said they had not read the book before the experience started. None the less, it is undeniable that the word 'Dieppe' is alone sufficient to suggest to the mind of any English person the famous raid of August 19, 1942.

Miss Moberly and Miss Jourdain, the percipients in the Trianon case, also had a guide book—Baedeker's *Paris*. Turning to the description of the Petit Trianon, the actual scene of their 'Adventure,' in the 1900 edition, we read: 'A visit should be paid to the Jardin du Petit Trianon, which is laid out in the English style and contains some fine exotic trees, an artificial lake, a 'Temple of Love', and a 'Hamlet' of nine or ten rustic cottages, where the court ladies played at rustic life.'

When the eye of the English-speaking reader lights on the word 'Hamlet' (so printed), it is apt to suggest to him the tragedy, although a moment later he realises that the celebrated *Hameau* is intended. But an image of Hamlet has been called up, however fleetingly, a picture of the solitary and melancholy man in conjunction with the 'Temple of Love.' These images may well account for the sinister cloaked figure which Miss Moberly and Miss Jourdain believed they had seen sitting close to the pillared kiosk.

That which is suggested by the word 'Dieppe' to two modern young Englishwomen who know what the sounds of war are, and that which is suggested by the words 'Temple of Love' and 'Hamlet' to two middle-aged spinsters of the year 1901 are, beyond all question, very different. But is there not an indication of the same principle lying behind their respective hallucinations? May we not have in both cases illustrations of the power of the mind to be cognisant of the contents of books and other sources of information which have not yet been seen, and, under rare and exceptional circumstances, to share this experience with another and bring it to consciousness by means of a visual or auditory hallucination or both?

I am well aware that Miss Moberly and Miss Jourdain displayed a sad ignorance of psychical research, scarcely excusable in women of their opportunities; but their severest critics may see in the experience of Mrs and Miss Norton some reason to reconsider whether the Trianon case did not have, at the outset, a genuinely paranormal basis.

It may also be thought desirable to enquire whether the percipients in the Dieppe Raid Case have ever read *An Adventure* or extracts from it.

W. H. W. SABINE

MR G. W. LAMBERT writes:

The Editor has shown me the above letters with the authors' permission, and I am glad to have the opportunity to make the following observations.

Mr Chesters is quite right in calling attention to a discrepancy between D.'s and A.'s statements as to the earliest phase of the experience. I noticed the discrepancy and asked the percipients questions with a view to resolving it but was not entirely successful. The discrepancy is unsatisfactory, but relates to a period of time which is small (5 minutes, at the outside) and is not of crucial importance, considering the margin of inaccuracy one must allow for in judging how long one has been awake in the dark before looking at the time.

In the course of my questioning I ascertained

(1) that the percipients took the time from their respective wrist-watches, which had *not* got luminous dials. It is to be inferred, therefore, that neither knew the time was 4.20 a.m. till the light was turned on. It is clear that the light was not turned on till A. returned to the room. I therefore inferred that D. heard the noise start at 4.20 a.m. minus 20 minutes—but this 20 minutes is necessarily a guess and, for all one can know, it may have been 3.47 or so, when (on 19 August 1942) the firing started, or some minutes after 4 a.m.

(2) that A. did (quite certainly) hear the noise while she was out of the room, just as she continued to hear it out on the balcony later on. (I was concerned to discover whether A.'s hearing of the noise was dependent on the close physical presence of D.; apparently it was not). I made no attempt in the report to draw out the full significance of the incident. I did not ask D. whether, during A.'s absence from the room, she also continued to hear the noises, but it is tolerably certain that she did.

The above supplementary information goes a long way to answer the points (a) to (g). It means that the time '4.20 a.m.' from the beginning of D.'s statement cannot be taken as exact, as she did not know the time was 4.20 till the light was turned on 20 minutes later. The existence of the discrepancy between the statements at this point is tantalizing, but is rather strong evidence against the theory of collaboration.

As to point (h), neither D. nor A. was 'interested' in the Dieppe raid, and had neither 'read it up' nor had it brought forcibly to her attention shortly before the experience. The possibility of collaboration in making up the whole story cannot be excluded, any more than can the possibility of 'faking' in what purports to have been a scientific experiment of a kind that cannot easily be repeated. The good faith of the percipients must either be accepted or not. In this case the investigators, who are not without experience in these matters, have more than usually full information affording grounds for accepting the good faith of the percipients.

In his very interesting comparison of the Dieppe Raid Case with the Trianon case of 1901, Mr Sabine asks whether the percipients in the former case had ever read *An Adventure* or extracts from it. Mrs Norton (D.), on being asked whether she had read that book, did not recognize the title, but, when Versailles was mentioned, had a vague recollection of it. She seemed to know the outline of the story, without any detail. It is, of course, possible that her unconscious memory of the Trianon case is much fuller than her conscious

recollection of it. But if the earlier case played any important part in suggesting the 'framework' of the later case, it is surprising that the later experience was not a visual hallucination, like the Trianon case, and like the earlier experiences of Mrs Norton herself, before her visit to the Dieppe neighbourhood. I would judge that both percipients had enough normally acquired knowledge of the Dieppe Raid, and experience, acquired doing the war, of noises made by guns, shells, etc., to 'explain' the occasion and general content of the experience of the 4th August, 1951, and that it is hardly necessary to call in aid forgotten details of the Trianon case. What the memory of past reading or experience cannot explain in the Dieppe Raid Case is the time coincidence factor which characterized an abnormal experience (prolonged *auditory* hallucination) unique in the lives of both percipients. If one admits that any feature of the experience came *ab extra*, where is one to draw the line?

ESP AS GUESSWORK

SIR,—When Mr Flew first put forward his suggestion about ESP and guesswork I failed to see the connexion, and his recent letter to the *Journal* does not make it any clearer. Certainly the process of 'guessing' deserves psychological study. It has long been realized that guesses do not come mysteriously out of the blue in strictly random fashion. In card-calling tests most subjects change their call from one trial to the next more frequently than occurs in a chance series, and every subject has his own symbol preferences and sequence habits. While it would be interesting to know the inner reasons for these habits, it is difficult to see how such knowledge could help towards an understanding of ESP.

In a succesful ESP test, there is a correlation between cards and calls which shows that one of the associations available to the subject, and effective in determining his choices, is the target order. No amount of knowledge of the ordinary associations which influence choices seems likely to explain how the concealed target becomes available to the subject.

The same consideration applies to spontaneous cases. It is interesting to know, for example, that a dream of a relative's death is due to unconscious hate, but this in no way explains the fulfilment of such a dream. Unlike Mr Flew, Freud seems to have been well aware of this when he put forward the theory that mediums are telepathically sensitive especially to the repressed complexes of their clients.

D. J. WEST

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